As we have seen, field battles were relatively rare in medieval warfare. It even happened that sovereigns or military leaders formally ordered their troops to avoid any major clashes: Charles V did this after Poitiers, Louis XI after Montlhéry, and Charles VII did so throughout most of his reign. The “obsessed” and “warlike” war, consisting of attacks on fortified places and their defense, from small and large expeditions, raids, adventures, took up most of the time and energy.
In the field battle, everyone saw the culmination of the war, the main event that determined the outcome of the campaign, the central episode with which, despite its limitations in time and space, all fears, expectations and hopes were associated. Moreover, in connection with it, the most acute tactical problems arose, which will be discussed further.
In medieval military history not only battles are known that were spontaneous, chaotic clashes, where commanders played the role of simple leaders and, no different from others, stayed in the front ranks in battle, where the main concern of the soldiers was to choose an enemy worthy of rank and valor, without thinking about their own comrades in arms, where everyone fought with a kind of sacred fury, but were ready to quickly flee as soon as it seemed that luck had changed them, where all actions were guided by the thirst for personal booty and ransom money, where panic could arise suddenly and uncontrollably, followed by general beating or capturing instantly paralyzed opponents. In any description of an open battle, two pitfalls must be avoided: dramatization and rationalization, i.e. reconstruction a posteriori tactics or a large-scale map, which, perhaps, did not exist at all and was not even intended.
However, a critical examination of the sources reveals the existence of several fundamental, normative tactical principles, adherence to which was considered, if not mandatory, then at least very desirable.
To greatly simplify the problem, we can consider three components of the disposition - cavalry, dismounted cavalry and infantry.
In the first case, the cavalry lined up in an elongated line at a very shallow depth, probably in three or four rows. Thus, a battlefield 1 km wide (a rare occurrence) could accommodate from 1,500 to 2,000 cavalrymen, forming a battalion, which consisted of tactical units standing in a row, called banners or detachments, usually from blood relatives, members of the lineage or vassals who fought together under one banner, with one leader and a common battle cry. The battle formation was very dense; to use expressions common to texts of that era, cavalrymen with spears had to stand so close to each other that a thrown glove, an apple or a plum would not fall to the ground, but would land on an upraised spear, or so that “no breeze would fly between the spears.” ". In such a battle line they rarely started moving all at once, sector by sector, usually attacking from the right; each sector could correspond to a formation called an “echelon” (“echelle”), later a company or squadron. Cavalry units this signal slowly moved away (“slow gait”, lat. gradatim, paulatim, gradu lento), maintaining the line of formation; the speed gradually increased, reaching a maximum at the moment of collision. When speaking about cavalry charges, Latin texts use significant adverbs: strongly, most powerfully, strongly, passionately, swiftly, most quickly (acriter, acerrime, fortiter, vehementer, impetuose, velocissime). And Jean de Buey reasoned like this: “The mounted battalion must fly at the enemy with fury, but one must be careful not to jump too far ahead, because deviation from the battle line and return entail defeat.” When the cavalry encountered infantry during an attack, its task was to disrupt their formation, breaking them into small groups, to “destroy”, “frustrate”, “sow chaos”. They sought the same thing in relation to the mounted enemy, but in this case they tried to get to the horses in order to knock the riders out of the saddle, then squires, marauders, and armed servants took over and completed the job. When the attack failed, the cavalrymen retreated, and while neighboring formations replaced them, they lined up and attacked again.
If the available personnel were too numerous to line up in one battle line, then other battalions were placed several tens of meters behind, constituting reserve or support forces, in addition, they often formed the left and right wings to protect the flanks or bypass the enemy. So at least in later Middle Ages, the army could be divided into five corps - left and right wing, vanguard, central battalion and rearguard.
The second important tactical technique is dismounted cavalry. Contrary to popular belief, its origins do not date back to the Hundred Years' War and are not associated with the appearance of English archers on continental battlefields. If the French themselves ignored cavalry dismounting for a long time, then in the Empire it was used quite often. Regarding one of the episodes of the Crusades in the Holy Land, when in 1148 the Roman king Conrad III and his knights fought on foot, the chronicle of William of Tire explains that “the Teutons usually do this when circumstances require it.” Anglo-Norman knights were also dismounted at the battles of Tenchebre (1106), Brömühl (1119) and Burgteruld (1124). By dismounting, cavalrymen lost much of their mobility, and the recommended tactic, at least in the later Middle Ages, was to stand still and wait for the enemy to be unwise in moving forward and charging. Jean de Buey remarks on this point: “When infantrymen clash against each other, then the attackers lose, and those who firmly hold their ground win.” In his opinion, it is necessary to provide for a good supply of provisions so that they can wait calmly; in the center should be placed “the most large squad» warriors under the standard of the commander-in-chief, on the sides - archers, and finally, at the edges of the battle line - two detachments of dismounted cavalry; Pages with horses should stay in cover behind.”
Finally, about the infantry in the proper sense of the word. Its military formations varied depending on traditions, as well as the available personnel, the enemy, and the nature of the terrain. The following infantry dispositions can be distinguished: 1) in the form of a rather elongated “wall”, only a few people deep; 2) in the form of a circle, or "crown", which was used by the Swiss, Flemings and Scots, or at the battle of Bouvines, when the Count of Boulogne with his cavalry retreated after each attack to rest under the cover of a double row of Brabant pikemen standing in a circle; 3) a massive and deep structure, inside of which there was no empty space; such was the triangular “battalion” of Liege infantrymen, standing close to each other, with their “spearhead” of the most determined people facing the enemy; The Confederate army at the Battle of Murten (1476), in addition to a small detachment of cavalry and a vanguard of 5,000 people, consisting of selected Swiss warriors (crossbowmen, arquebusiers, pikemen), had a military formation (Gewalthaufen) in the shape of an elongated quadrangle topped with a triangle (formation wedge – Keil); along the perimeter of this formation, numbering about 10,000 people, pikemen stood in four rows (with pikes approximately 5.5 m long), the entire center was occupied by halberdiers, whose weapons were only 1.8 m long; behind it was a rearguard, smaller in composition, but of the same shape (Fig. 3); the pikemen were supposed to break the enemy’s battle formation, after which the halberdiers would come into action; in the event of an attack by enemy cavalry, the pikemen had to bristle with pikes. Modern reconstructions show that under such conditions, a corps of 10,000 people occupied an area of only 60x60 m.
To these three types of troops (cavalry, dismounted cavalry, infantry) others could be added, especially riflemen (15th century and culveriners) and field artillery. Since the active armies included both cavalry and infantry, it follows that pre-developed, highly complex flexible battle formations. The battle plan submitted for approval to Duke John the Fearless of Burgundy and his council (September 1417) provided, for example, that in the event of an enemy attack, both the vanguard and both wings of archers and crossbowmen, as well as the main battalion, which should stay close to the vanguard, if space allows, or 50-60 steps behind, and at arrow flight distance (100-200 m) a rearguard was placed, consisting of 400 heavy cavalrymen and 300 riflemen, making sure that the army did not turn back. Finally, further behind the rearguard, a convoy was located, forming a kind of fortified camp. However, in case of an attack on the enemy, other dispositions were envisaged.”
Rice. 3. Combat formation of the Swiss at the Battle of Murten (1476). (By: Grosjean G. Die Murtenschlacht. (54)).
The ideal battle formation prescribed by Charles the Bold according to the Lausanne Ordinance (May 1476) shows the degree of complexity of tactics that could be achieved at the end of the 15th century. a professional military man (and the Duke strived for maximum perfection). Apparently, in order to adapt his army to any terrain conditions, he provided eight formations. In the first, lined up from left to right were 100 cavalrymen of the Ordinance Company of Captain Taglian, then 300 archers from the same company, 1700 “foot boys” of Nolin de Bournonville and, finally, 300 archers and 100 cavalrymen of the Ordinance Company of Captain Mariano - a total of 1800 people chosen from among the best, under the command of Guillaume de La Baume, lord d'Illen. The composition of the second formation, formed from the troops of the ducal house, was even more complex: also three detachments of cavalrymen, three detachments of archers and three infantrymen alternated from left to right. In the middle of this elite corps the signs of ducal dignity rose: the standard of Charles the Bold, his pennant and banner. As for the other six formations, not so exemplary, they were built like the first: the infantry was placed in the center, and on the sides were the arrows and cavalrymen supporting it. True, it existed only in a project to strengthen the Burgundian army in the event of the approach of the Savoyards.
For better coordination and in order to avoid the fragmentation of the forces due to the nature of the terrain, provision was made for the regrouping of these eight formations in twos under the command of four senior military commanders. When gathering all his forces, the Duke of Burgundy could thus have 15-20 thousand warriors at his disposal (Fig. 4).
The actual disposition that Charles the Bold was forced to take a few days later at the Battle of Murten indicates that he was not at all a slave to ready-made schemes and was able to adapt to the conditions of the terrain and the enemy. Apparently, for him, one of the foundations of tactics was the interaction of various types of troops - cavalry, artillery, infantry with melee weapons and riflemen (Map 7).
In fact, the course of battles could always change for the worse due to the indiscipline of entire detachments and individual warriors who rushed for the spoils of war. However, it would be completely erroneous to believe that this was not realized: in any case, since the second half of the Middle Ages, commanders usually announced the most severe punishments for all those who, for whatever reason, break ranks and disrupt order, the socialization of all spoils with its subsequent division was formally recommended, although not always encouraged and practiced. “In order for the spoils to belong to the entire army, it is necessary to prohibit robberies and announce to all troops that violation of the commander’s order is punishable by hanging by the throat” (Robert de Balzac).
It also cannot be said that in the Middle Ages they did not understand what advantages a commander received if on the day of battle he stayed on a hill or away from the battle, avoiding, on the one hand, dangerous surprises and, on the other hand, receiving the opportunity to make the necessary decisions while surrounded a kind of headquarters.
Rice. 4. Battle formation of the Burgundians at Lausanne according to the order of Charles the Bold (May 1476) (By: Grosjean G. Die Murtenschlacht... (54))
Map 7. Murten, 1476. Battle plan of Charles the Bold (By: Grosjean G. Die Murtenschlacht... (54)).
An offensive is the main type of combat carried out with the aim of defeating the enemy and capturing important areas (lines, objects) of the terrain.
Offensive- the main type of combat carried out with the aim of defeating the enemy and capturing important areas (lines, objects) of the terrain. It consists of defeating the enemy with all available means, a decisive attack, the rapid advancement of troops into the depths of his location, the destruction and capture of manpower, the seizure of weapons, military equipment and designated areas (boundaries) of the area.
Attack- rapid and non-stop movement of tank, motorized rifle and parachute units in battle formation, combined with intense fire.
During an attack, a fighter in a squad relentlessly follows the armored vehicles and uses his fire to destroy enemy fire weapons, primarily anti-tank weapons.
Attack
Depending on the task being performed and the conditions of the situation, the offensive can be carried out on an infantry fighting vehicle (armored personnel carrier, tank), inside (except for a tank) or by landing from above.
The machine gunner and machine gunner should know that when firing through loopholes, the direction of fire should be 45-60°; and shooting should be carried out only in short bursts of the loophole; the direction of fire should be 45-60°; and shooting is carried out only in short bursts.
Actions of personnel in armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles during an attack on combat vehicles.
Attack on foot
When attacking on foot, at the command of the squad commander, “Squad, prepare to dismount,” the soldier puts the weapon on safety, removes it from the loophole (when operating as a landing party inside the vehicle) and prepares to dismount. When the vehicle reaches the dismounting line, on the command “To the vehicle,” he jumps out of the combat vehicle and on the command of the squad commander, “Squad, in the direction of (such and such), guiding (such and such), - to battle, forward” or “Squad, follow me - to battle" takes his place in the chain with an interval between employees of 6-8 m (8-12 steps) and, firing on the move, running or at an accelerated pace as part of the squad, continues to move towards the front edge of the enemy.
Deployment of a squad from pre-battle formation to combat formation.
The attack should be swift; a slow-moving fighter is a convenient target for the enemy.
In cases where a squad maneuvers due to a change in direction of movement or a soldier encounters an obstacle, it is strictly forbidden to change his place in the squad’s battle formation. During the offensive, keep an eye on your neighbors on the right and left, follow (the signals) given by the commanders and carry them out clearly, and if necessary, duplicate commands to your neighbors.
Crossing a minefield along a passage following a tank.
Overcoming a minefield using a passage made in advance if it is impossible to use armored vehicles.
Having approached the enemy trench at 30-35 m, the fighter, on the command of the commander “Grenade - fire” or independently, throws a grenade into the trench and with a swift jerk, bending down and shouting “Hurray!” resolutely bursts into the front line of defense, destroys the enemy with point-blank fire and continues the attack non-stop in the indicated direction.
Attack of the enemy's front line of defense. Fire with grenades.
If a soldier is forced to fight in a trench or communication line, he advances as quickly as possible. Before entering a break in a trench or communication passage, he throws a grenade and fires 1-2 bursts from personal weapons (“combing with fire”). It is advisable for two people to inspect the trench, with one moving along the trench, and the second bending down slightly behind, warning the soldier in the trench about bends and other dangerous places(dugouts, blocked slits, shooting cells). Wire barriers in the form of “hedgehogs”, “slingshots”, etc., placed by the enemy in the trench, are thrown upward with a bayonet-knife attached to the machine gun, and if they are mined, they are walked over the top of the trench. Detected minefields are marked with clearly visible signs (scraps of red or white material) or destroyed by detonation. While moving along the trench, you should make as little noise as possible, using bayonet thrusts, blows with a butt, magazine or infantry shovel to destroy the enemy.
Fight in a trench.
Advancement along the trench.
When personnel are dismounted, infantry fighting vehicles (armored personnel carriers) move in leaps and bounds, behind the attackers, from cover to cover, providing reliable fire cover at a distance of up to 200 m, and in the case of weak enemy anti-tank defense, in the battle formations of dismounted units.
Fire is fired over the squad chain and into the spaces between squads. In some cases, armored vehicles are combined into armored groups and are also used to provide fire support to attackers, firing from permanent or temporary firing positions.
The sniper, acting in the attacking chain, or behind the attackers, carefully observes the battlefield and primarily hits the most dangerous targets (ATGM crews, grenade launchers, machine gunners, as well as enemy command personnel). Sniper fire is also effective against the aiming and observation devices of enemy combat vehicles.
An offensive in depth, as a rule, is carried out by landing troops in armored vehicles; barriers and obstacles are, as a rule, bypassed; the enemy in the discovered strong points and centers of resistance is destroyed by a swift attack on the flank and rear.
Sometimes during an offensive, when advancing to the attack line, fighters can move behind an infantry fighting vehicle (armored personnel carrier) under the cover of armor.
The offensive is covered by a corps of armored vehicles.
Offensive in the city
Combat in the city requires a soldier to be able to outwit the enemy, decisiveness and iron endurance. The defending enemy is especially treacherous; his counterattacks and fire should be expected from everywhere. Before the attack, you should reliably suppress the enemy, and during the attack, conduct preemptive fire in short bursts at windows, doors and embrasures (breaks in walls, fences) of the attacked and neighboring buildings. When moving to the site, use underground communications, breaks in walls, forested areas, dusty areas and smoke. When conducting combat in a city, combat pairs or trios (combat crews) should be formed in squads (platoons), taking into account the individual combat experience of the fighters and their personal attachment. During the battle, the maneuver and actions of one must be supported by the fire of fellow crew members, and the actions of the crew must be supported by the fire of other crews and armored vehicles.
Calculation actions as part of a troika
When conducting an offensive in a city, soldiers move on the battlefield, as a rule, in short dashes from cover to cover with reliable fire support from their comrades and combat vehicles. Under enemy fire, the length of the dash should not exceed 8-10 meters (10-12 steps), while straight-line movement should be avoided, moving in a zigzag.
Methods of movement when fighting in the city
Target designation of combat vehicles is carried out with tracer bullets, for which each machine gunner must have one magazine loaded with cartridges with tracer bullets.
Approaching the building, the fighter throws a hand grenade at the windows (doors, breaches) and, firing from a machine gun, gets inside.
When fighting inside a building, a soldier acts quickly and decisively; before breaking into a room, it is “combed” with fire or thrown with grenades. You should be wary of closed doors because... they may be mined. Indoors, very often the enemy hides behind a door or pieces of furniture (sofas, armchairs, cabinets, etc.).
Moving along the floors, it is necessary to shoot through the landings between the staircases, move from the landing using a throw, move from top to bottom while crouching in such a way as to notice the enemy before he notices you (your legs).
Actions when moving up flights of stairs
Actions of a crew as part of a troika during indoor combat
Locked doors are destroyed by a grenade or a burst from a machine gun at the lock. Having captured a building and cleared it of the enemy, you should quickly move to the next one, not giving the enemy the opportunity to gain a foothold in it.
Offensive in the mountains
When advancing in the mountains, the main role in destroying the enemy is assigned to infantry units, artillery and aviation.
When attacking the enemy, you should pin him down with fire, widely use maneuvers in order to reach the flank and rear, occupy dominant heights and carry out a top-down attack.
Squad maneuver to exit for a top-down attack
In the mountains, when advancing, it is necessary to move, as a rule, at an accelerated pace or in short dashes, while more than half of the attackers must cover the movement of their comrades on the battlefield with fire. In the mountains, as well as in the city, it is advisable to use combat crew tactics.
Crew actions when moving to the attack line (to the starting point for the attack)
When throwing hand fragmentation grenades from bottom to top, it is recommended to use grenades with a contact fuse such as RGO, RGN or throw a grenade like RGD-5, RG-42 over the enemy’s trench (shelter). When throwing a grenade from top to bottom, do not throw it too far or throw it directly into the trench, taking into account the grenade rolling down the slope.
An offensive in a populated area, mountains and forest requires an increased consumption of ammunition, especially hand grenades; therefore, when preparing, you should take with you ammunition in excess of the established portable ammunition, but you should always remember about saving and preserving an emergency reserve, which also increases.
Approximate list of ammunition when conducting combat operations in populated areas, mountains and forests.
It is recommended to fire from the RPG-7 hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher and RPG-18 (22, 26) rocket-propelled anti-tank grenades in the mountains, populated areas and forests against enemy personnel located behind shelters with the expectation of being hit by its fragments and the blast wave of an exploding grenade.
Medieval battles slowly moved from skirmishes between poorly organized military units to battles involving tactics and maneuver. In part, this evolution was a response to the development of different types of troops and weapons and the ability to use them. The first armies of the Dark Middle Ages were crowds of foot soldiers. With the development of heavy cavalry, the best armies turned into crowds of knights. Foot soldiers were used to ravage agricultural lands and do heavy work during sieges. In battle, however, the infantry was threatened on both sides as the knights sought to meet the enemy in single combat. The infantry in this early period consisted of feudal conscripts and untrained peasants. Archers were also useful in sieges, but they also risked being trampled on the battlefield.
By the end of the 15th century, military leaders had made great strides in disciplining knights and creating armies that acted as a team. In the English army, knights grudgingly accepted archers after they had demonstrated their worth in a large number of battles. Discipline also increased as more and more knights began to fight for money and less for honor and glory. Mercenary soldiers in Italy became famous for their long campaigns with relatively little bloodshed. By this time, soldiers of all branches of the military had become property that could not be easily parted with. Feudal armies that sought glory became professional armies that were more concerned with survival so they could spend the money they earned.
Cavalry tactics
The cavalry was usually divided into three groups, or divisions, which were sent into battle one after another. The first wave had to break through the enemy ranks or break them so that the second or third wave could break through. If the enemy fled, the real massacre began.
In practice, the knights acted in their own way to the detriment of any plans of the military leader. The knights were mainly interested in honors and glory and did not skimp on funds in the front rank of the first division. Complete victory in battle was secondary to personal glory. Battle after battle, the knights rushed to attack as soon as they saw the enemy, ruining any plans.
Sometimes military leaders dismounted knights to better control them. This was a common course of action in a small army that had little chance of resisting attacks. Dismounted knights supported the fighting strength and morale of the regular infantry. Dismounted knights and other foot soldiers fought over stakes or other military installations designed to blunt the power of cavalry charges.
An example of the undisciplined behavior of knights was the Battle of Crecy in 1346. The French army outnumbered the English one several times (forty thousand and ten thousand), having significantly more mounted knights. The English were divided into three groups of archers, protected by stakes driven into the ground. Between these three groups were two groups of dismounted knights. The third group of dismounted knights was held in reserve. Genoese mercenary crossbowmen were sent by the French king to shoot at the English infantry while he tried to organize his knights into three divisions. However, the crossbows became wet and proved ineffective. The French knights ignored their king's efforts to organize as soon as they saw the enemy, and worked themselves into a frenzy with cries of "Kill! Kill!" Kill! Having lost patience with the Genoese, the French king ordered his knights to attack, and they trampled the crossbowmen along the way. Although the battle lasted all day, the dismounted English knights and archers (who kept their bowstrings dry) were victorious over the mounted French, who fought in a disorderly crowd.
By the end of the Middle Ages, the importance of heavy cavalry on the battlefield declined and became approximately equal to the importance of rifle troops and infantry. By this time the futility of an attack against properly positioned and disciplined infantry had become clear. The rules have changed. Stockades, horse pits, and ditches became common defenses for armies against cavalry attacks. Attacks against numerous formations of spearmen and archers or shooters from firearms leaving only a heap of crushed horses and people. The knights were forced to fight on foot or wait for the right opportunity to attack. Devastating attacks were still possible, but only if the enemy fled disorganized or was outside the protection of temporary field installations.
Tactics of rifle troops
For most of this era, rifle troops consisted of archers using several types of bows. At first it was a short bow, then a crossbow and a long bow. The advantage of archers was the ability to kill or wound enemies from a distance without engaging in hand-to-hand combat. The importance of these troops was well known in ancient times, but this experience was temporarily lost during the Dark Middle Ages. The main ones during the early Middle Ages were warrior knights who controlled the territory, and their code required a duel with a worthy enemy. Murder with arrows long distance was shameful from the point of view of the knights, so the ruling class did little to develop this type of weapon and its effective use.
However, it gradually became clear that archers were effective and extremely useful in both sieges and battles. Although reluctantly, more and more armies made way for them. William I's decisive victory at Hastings in 1066 may have been won by archers, although his knights traditionally received the highest honours. The Anglo-Saxons held the hillside and were so protected by closed shields that the Norman knights found it very difficult to break through them. The battle continued all day. The Anglo-Saxons ventured out from behind the shield wall, partly to reach the Norman archers. And when they came out, the knights easily knocked them down. For a time it looked as if the Normans were going to lose, but many believe that the battle was won by the Norman archers. A lucky shot mortally wounded Harold, king of the Anglo-Saxons, and the battle ended soon after.
Foot archers fought in numerous battle formations of hundreds or even thousands of men. A hundred yards from the enemy, a shot from either a crossbow or a longbow could pierce armor. At this distance, archers shot at individual targets. The enemy was furious at such losses, especially if he could not respond. In an ideal situation, archers broke up enemy formations by shooting at them for some time. The enemy could hide from cavalry attacks behind a palisade, but could not stop all the arrows flying at him. If the enemy came out from behind the fence and attacked the archers, friendly heavy cavalry would enter the battle, well, if in time to save the archers. If the enemy formations simply stood still, they could gradually move so that the cavalry was able to make a successful attack.
Archers were actively supported and subsidized in England as the English were outnumbered in the war on the mainland. When the English learned to use a large contingent of archers, they began to win battles, even though the enemy usually outnumbered them. The British developed the "arrow shaft" method, taking advantage of the longbow's range. Instead of shooting at individual targets, archers with longbows shot at areas occupied by the enemy. Firing up to six shots per minute, 3,000 longbow archers could fire 18,000 arrows at numerous enemy formations. The impact of this boom on horses and people was devastating. French knights during the Hundred Years' War spoke of the sky being blackened by arrows and the noise these missiles made as they flew.
Crossbowmen became a prominent force in mainland armies, especially in the militia and professional forces raised by the cities. The crossbowman became a ready-to-action soldier with minimal training.
By the fourteenth century, the first primitive hand-held firearms, the handguns, appeared on the battlefields. Subsequently, it became even more effective than bows.
The difficulty in using archers was ensuring their protection while shooting. In order for the shooting to be effective, they had to be very close to the enemy. English archers brought stakes to the battlefield and hammered them into the ground with mallets in front of the place from which they wanted to fire. These stakes gave them some protection from enemy cavalry. And in protecting themselves from enemy archers, they relied on their weapons. They were at a disadvantage when attacked by enemy infantry. Crossbowmen took into battle huge shields equipped with supports. These shields made up walls from behind which people could shoot.
By the end of the era, archers and spearmen acted together in mixed formations. The spears were held by the enemy melee troops, while the missile troops (crossbowmen or firearms marksmen) fired at the enemy. These mixed formations learned to move and attack. The enemy cavalry was forced to retreat in the face of a disciplined mixed force of spearmen and crossbowmen or gunners. If the enemy could not inflict retaliation with their own arrows and spears, the battle was most likely lost.
Infantry tactics
Infantry tactics during the Dark Middle Ages were simple - approach the enemy and engage in battle. The Franks threw their axes just before closing in to cut down the enemy. The warriors expected victory through strength and ferocity.
The development of chivalry temporarily eclipsed infantry on the battlefield, mainly because disciplined and well-trained infantry did not then exist. The foot soldiers of the armies of the early Middle Ages were mostly poorly armed and poorly trained peasants.
The Saxons and Vikings came up with a defensive tactic called a shield wall. The warriors stood close to each other, moving their long shields to form a barrier. This helped them protect themselves from archers and cavalry, which were not present in their armies.
The revival of infantry occurred in areas that did not have the resources to support heavy cavalry - in hilly countries like Scotland and Switzerland, and in growing cities. Out of necessity, these two sectors found ways to field effective armies with little or no cavalry. Both groups found that horses would not charge against a barrage of sharp stakes or spearheads. A disciplined army of spearmen could stop the elite heavy cavalry units of wealthier nations and lords for a fraction of the cost of a heavy cavalry army.
The schiltron battle formation, which was a circle of spearmen, began to be used by the Scots during the wars of independence at the end of the thirteenth century (reflected in the movie “Braveheart”). They realized that the schiltron was an effective defensive formation. Robert the Bruce suggested that the English knights fight only in marshy areas, which made it very difficult for heavy cavalry to attack.
Swiss spearmen became widely known. They essentially revived the Greek phalanx and had great success fighting with long polearms. They created a square of spearmen. The four outer ranks held the spears almost horizontally, tilted slightly downwards. This was an effective barrage against cavalry. The rear ranks used bladed polearms to attack the enemy as they approached the formation. The Swiss were so well trained that their troops could move relatively quickly, allowing them to transform a defensive formation into an effective offensive battle formation.
The response to the appearance of the spearmen's battle formations was artillery, which punched holes in the dense ranks of troops. The Spaniards were the first to use it effectively. Spanish shield bearers armed with swords also successfully fought with the spearmen. These were lightly armored soldiers who could easily move among spears and fight effectively with short swords. Their shields were small and handy. At the end of the Middle Ages, the Spaniards were also the first to experiment by combining spearmen, swordsmen and firearms shooters in one battle formation. It was an effective army that could use any weapon on any terrain for both defense and attack. At the end of this era, the Spanish were the most effective military force in Europe.
Tactics, or theory of battle
War is a combination of many individual battles. This combination may or may not be wise, and success largely depends on it. And yet the most important point is the outcome of the battle. After all, only a combination of successful battles can lead to good results. The most important thing in war will always be the art of defeating the enemy in battle. Your Imperial Highness's full attention must be directed to this issue. I consider the following principles to be the most important:
General principles of defense
1. Keep your troops hidden from the enemy for as long as possible. Since the likelihood of attack from the enemy is high, unless we attack ourselves, we should always be on our guard and keep our troops hidden from the enemy as long as possible.
2. Do not bring all your troops into battle at once. Such actions indicate a lack of wisdom needed to fight a battle. Only if you have reserves of troops at your disposal can you turn the tide of the battle at the decisive moment.
3. Worry less or not worry at all about the length of our front. This in itself is not important, but the length of the front limits the depth of our formation (that is, the number of corps standing one behind the other). Troops left in the rear must always be ready for battle. They can be used either to restart the battle in the same area, or to bring them into battle in other areas located nearby. This principle is a consequence of the previous one.
4. When attacking, the enemy often seeks to simultaneously outflank and encircle us. Army corps in the rear can repel this attempt and thus provide support for the main front, which is usually provided by natural obstacles on the ground. This arrangement of troops is better than extending the front line, since in this case it is more difficult for the enemy to outflank us. This principle is again a closer definition of the second.
5. If we have many troops in reserve, only part of them should be located directly in front of the front. The remaining troops should be hidden behind.
From this position they, in turn, can attack enemy columns seeking to surround us from the flanks.
6. Main principle is to never remain completely passive, but to attack the enemy from the front and flanks, even when he is attacking. Therefore, we should defend ourselves on this front simply in order to force the enemy to deploy his forces on the offensive on this front. We then, in turn, attack with those of our troops who were holding in the rear. The art of building fortifications, as Your Royal Highness once so admirably observed, is needed by the defender not in order to defend himself safely in a trench, but in order to attack the enemy more successfully. This idea should be applied to any passive defense. Such defense is nothing more than a means by which we can most effectively attack the enemy in a pre-selected and appropriately equipped area where we have deployed our troops.
7. An attack from a defensive position can be launched at the moment when the enemy is advancing or while he is still on the march. At the moment when you need to attack, you can pull back your troops, lure the enemy into unknown territory and attack him from both sides. An echelon order of battle, that is, an order in which only two-thirds, half, or even less of the army is advanced, and the remaining troops, if possible, directly or indirectly hidden, is very suitable for all movements. Therefore, the type of combat formation is of great importance.
8. If, for example, I had two divisions, I would prefer to keep one in the rear. If I had three, I'd keep at least one in the rear, and if I had four, I'd probably keep two. If I had five, I would keep at least two in reserve, and in many cases even three, etc.
9. Where we remain passive, we must use the art of building fortifications. This will require numerous works in compliance with strict rules for the construction of such structures.
10. When creating a battle plan, we must set ourselves a major goal, such as attacking a large enemy column or completely destroying it. If our goal is small and the enemy's goal is vast, we will naturally suffer a severe defeat because we will be petty and wasteful.
11. Having set ourselves a high goal in our defense plan (destroying an enemy column, etc.), we must direct all our energy and strength to its implementation. In most cases, the attacker will pursue his own target somewhere else. While we are attacking, for example, his right wing, he will try to gain decisive advantages on the left. If we weaken before the enemy, if we pursue our goal with less energy than he, he will achieve the full advantage, while we will achieve only half the advantage. Thus, he will have an advantage; victory will be his, and we will have to give up even partially won advantages. If Your Royal Highness carefully reads the history of the battles of Ratisbon and Wagram, all this will seem true and important to you.
12. Let me restate the last two principles. Their combination gives us a principle which must rank first among all instances of victory in the modern art of war: "Pursue one great decisive object with strength and perseverance."
13. True, in this case, if we are defeated, the danger will be even greater. But increasing caution at the expense of the achieved result is not the art of war. This is a false caution, which, as I have already said in my Principles of War in General, is contrary to the nature of war. For the sake of great goals, we must do daring things. When we are engaged in a daring enterprise, proper caution is not to neglect, through laziness, indolence, or carelessness, those measures which will help us to achieve our goal. An example is Napoleon, who, out of prudence, never pursued major goals timidly or hesitantly.
If you remember, most gracious sir, the few defensive battles that have ever been won, you will find that the best of them were fought in the spirit of the principles here laid down. After all, it was the study of the history of war that gave us these principles.
At Minden, Duke Ferdinand suddenly appeared when the enemy was not expecting him and went on the offensive, while at Thannhausen he defended passively behind the earthworks. Under Rosbach, the army of Frederick II attacked the enemy in an unexpected place and at an unexpected moment.
At Liegnitz, the Austrians discovered the king at night in a position completely different from the one in which they had seen him the day before. He attacked the enemy column with his entire army and routed it before the rest could begin to fight.
Under Hohenlinden, Moreau had five divisions in the front line and four immediately behind them in the rear and on the flanks. He outflanked the enemy and attacked their right wing before they could attack.
At Ratisbon (Regensburg), Marshal Davout defended himself passively, while Napoleon attacked the V and VI Army Corps with his right wing and completely defeated them.
Although the Austrians were mostly on the defensive at Wagram, on the second day they attacked the French with the bulk of their forces. Therefore, Napoleon could also be considered a defender. However, then the right wing of the French (Davout) had success against the left wing of the Austrians. At the same time, the Austrians were active against Napoleon's left wing and advanced as far as Essling, but were driven back by a counterattack by strong French reserves. Then MacDonald's strike force, advancing to the left of center, forced the Austrians to a general retreat, including from positions on the Russbach River.
Not all of the principles mentioned earlier are clearly evident in each of these battles, but they are all examples of active defense.
The mobility of the Prussian army under Frederick II was a means of achieving victory on which we can no longer count, because other armies are at least as mobile as ours. On the other hand, encirclement on the flanks was less common at that time, and a deep battle formation was therefore less necessary.
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(“Teaching and cunning of the military formation of infantry people”
Moscow, 1647)
The basis of the ancient Russian army was the “regiment”, which in the ancient understanding meant an organized battle order, as opposed to a mass, a crowd. “Standing in a regiment” meant being armed and taking an orderly position on the battlefield, which in the old days was called a “horde” or “battleground.” Subsequently, a “regiment” began to be called a separate army or squad that had its own commander, its own banner - “banner”, and was an independent combat unit.
During the heyday and power of Kievan Rus (XI-XII centuries), the main formation of the Russian army for battle was the so-called “regimental rank” - division along the front into three components: a “large regiment” or “person”, consisting of infantry; - “right hand” and “ left hand" - horse regiments standing on the flanks. This formation is very reminiscent of the ancient Greek “phalanx”, also covered by cavalry on the flanks, which was later adopted by the Roman Empire. The ancient Rus could well have become acquainted with it during the wars with Byzantium in the 9th-10th centuries.
The “large regiment” on foot was stretched along the front in one line. The front of the foot regiment, where the soldiers stood in dense ranks, was called the “wall.” The first ranks were made up of spearmen who had good armor - “good armor” and large almond-shaped “scarlet” (i.e., crimson-red) shields that covered the warriors from their shoulders to their toes. The rear ranks placed their spears on the shoulders of those in front, forming a continuous palisade. For additional protection against attacks by enemy cavalry, the infantry could drive short, sharpened stakes along the front.
Armed and unarmored warriors with melee weapons - axes, clubs, boot knives - became worse in the rear ranks.
Archers - “streltsy” or “skirmishers” - at the beginning of the battle, as a rule, left the mass of a large regiment and stood in front of it in open ranks. However, as the battle progressed, they could be both in the depths of the formation and behind it, sending arrows over the heads of the front ranks.
The regiments of the “right” and “left” hands were made up of cavalry - the “mounted” or “top” army, the prince’s warriors, having in the front ranks the strongest and most heavily armed fighters. “Strong guards” were sent in all directions - reconnaissance and combat protection of the army.
The battle began with archers - “skirmishers”, crushing the front ranks of the advancing enemy with volleys from their powerful bows.
This was followed by a clash of main forces. The infantry in the center began to “cut hand to hand”, trying at the same time to withstand the onslaught of the enemy - “not to destroy the wall”, force him to get drawn into close combat and mix up his ranks, after which the cavalry of the right and left hands covered the enemy’s flanks, squeezed him and finished him off . If the “wall” was nevertheless broken through by the enemy, and enemy soldiers wedged themselves into the battle formations of a large regiment, the infantrymen gathered in so-called “piles”, standing with their backs to each other and closing their shields.
The first reliable evidence of the use of this military formation can be considered the description of the battle near the town of Listven, not far from Chernigov, where in 1024, in a dispute over the Chernigov lands, the armies of two brother princes came together: the Tmutarakan prince Mstislav and his older brother Yaroslav, who later became the great Kyiv prince Yaroslav Wise.
Mstislav’s warriors formed a “regimental row” on the battlefield: in the center were Chernigov foot warriors-militia, and on the flanks were Mstislav’s cavalry squad. The army of Prince Yaroslav, consisting of only infantry - hired Varangians and "eager" Novgorod fellows, stood in a dense, monolithic mass.
The battle was brutal, and the Varangians standing in the center began to defeat the Chernigov foot warriors. However, Mstislav's selected cavalry squad crushed their formation with a blow from the flanks. Everyone who did not die on the spot fled. The runners were not pursued - the princely dispute was resolved.
During the formation of Muscovite Rus' (XIV-XV centuries), the traditional “regimental row” became somewhat more complicated - it already amounted to five regiments. To the main forces - the same three regiments deployed along the front - “big”, “ right hand" and "left hand", more "advanced" ("guard") and "ambush" ("rear", "western") regiments are added. The "watchmen", which were sent in small detachments in all directions, were consolidated into the sixth regiment - "ertaul".
It should be noted that the proportion of cavalry in the Moscow army was constantly increasing, although the bulk was still infantry.
The battle strategy was as follows. The first to enter the battle was the “guard” regiment - lightly armed horsemen and horse archers. They came close to the enemy’s vanguard, and, following the ancient tradition, began the battle with duels best fighters on both sides. These heroic fights made it possible to test the strength and fighting spirit of the enemy and gave the “initiation” to the entire battle. The outcome of these martial arts had a very great psychological significance for the outcome of the upcoming battle, and therefore many famous knights and daredevils joined the ranks of the guard regiment in advance. Having upset as much as possible the advanced detachments of the enemy, the regiment had to retreat behind the line of its main forces and joined them.
In the battle of the main forces, the foot "large regiment" played the role of a stable core of the army, withstanding the main onslaught of the enemy. The main striking force was the cavalry regiments of the right and left hands, as well as the ambush regiment.
The regiments of the “right” and “left hand” consisted mainly of heavily armed cavalry - “forged army”. At the same time, the regiment of the “right hand” was the strongest of them and dealt the main blow, and the regiment of the “left hand” was the auxiliary blow.. The strongest squads and the most eminent princes and boyars were always placed on the “right hand”. It was more honorable to stand “on the right hand” than “on the left.” According to the “rank” - the military hierarchy of Muscovite Rus' in the 16th century - the governor of the “right hand” stood above the governor of the “left hand”.
“Ambush Regiment” is a general strategic reserve, the introduction of which at the right moment was supposed to decide the outcome of the battle. It was made up of selected, best squads, usually heavy cavalry. The “ambush” regiment was always placed on the left, as if balancing its mass with the regiment of the right hand. It was located so as not to be visible to the enemy until the time came - behind a forest, a hillside, behind the formation of the main forces.
According to written sources, similar tactics were used both against the Tatars and against the Western opponents of Rus' - Lithuania and the Order Germans.
In the 16th century, with the appearance in the Russian army large quantities firearms, to protect the “streltsy” the so-called “walk-city” was invented - a movable field fortification made up of large wooden shields with loopholes for shooting. 
These shields, depending on the time of year, were placed on wheels or on runners, which made them easy to move during battle. The “walk-city” was transported disassembled on carts or sleighs and, before the battle, was quickly assembled by carpenters and archers from separate boards. Usually the “walk-gorod” was installed in front of the formation of the “large regiment”, and the guns of the “regimental outfit” were placed on the flanks. The cavalry attacked from the flanks, taking cover behind field fortifications if necessary.
The use of the “walk-city” in 1572 is documented in the grandiose battle near Moscow, near the village of Molodi, in which the Russian army under the command of the governor Prince M.I. Vorotynsky won a decisive victory over the army of the Crimean Khan Davlet-Girey.
