It was the summer of 1877, the very height of the Russian-Turkish War - already the eleventh in a row. In June, Russian expeditionary forces successfully crossed the Danube and entered the land of Bulgaria, which at that time was a province of the Ottoman Empire. The northern Bulgarian cities - Plevna and Tarnovo - were marked by the Russian command as points that were to be captured first. To prevent the Turks from attacking the Russian troops from the south at this time, a detachment was sent to the Shipka Pass in the Balkan Mountains, whose task was to defend the rocky road leading to the north of Bulgaria through Gabrovo. This mountain pass was of very great strategic importance: control over it ensured freedom of movement for the Russian army in northern Bulgaria.

The defense of the Shipka Pass is undoubtedly one of the most striking episodes in the history of Russian weapons, and it is not surprising that in the official Russian, Soviet and Bulgarian historiography over the past 135 years a glorified image of the Shipka epic has been created. There was no room left for some details of the defense of Shipka, dissonant with the legend of the Russian miracle heroes who liberated Bulgaria from Turkish captivity.

Now it is not immediately possible to discern this living history against the backdrop of numerous films, monuments and anniversary collections of memoirs. But there is a scattering of memoirs of participants in the Shipka battles, not edited by state attention, published in special publications such as “Military Collection” or “Artillery Journal”, or published separately in small editions. They have not yet been systematized or republished, but getting to know them makes it possible to look at the Shipka battles from a different perspective.

It was a six-day battle that pitted Russian soldiers and Bulgarian militia against Suleiman Pasha's army, which outnumbered the pass's defenders five to one. The pass was held, but was besieged by the Turks.

The Russians defended Shipka through a harsh winter that claimed the lives of several thousand soldiers. But victory remained with the besieged: the December offensive of the Russian army helped unblock the Shipka garrison.

From a telegram from General Nikolai Stoletov: “The entire corps of Suleiman Pasha with numerous cavalry, artillery and convoys lined up in front of the position I occupied. Tomorrow the enemy will storm Shipka. I will defend myself to the last extreme, but I consider it my duty to report that the disproportion of forces is too great. Considering our position to be very important, I ask for reinforcements." From the memoirs of staff captain Ivan Polikarpov: « The right activity passage required the indispensable capture of Little Bedek and Bald Mountain... Since these peaks were free, the enemy, having occupied them, could fire at our position in any direction... But the most dangerous point, as the point of the most convenient attack, was the road from Lysa to the Central Mountain. She cut off St. Nicholas and gave the whole road to Gabrovo into the hands of the enemy.”

Three mistakes

The detachment reached its destination on July 7, late in the evening. By this time, the Turks had already left the pass, leaving, according to Second Lieutenant Gabriel Kisnemsky, unfinished coffee and the disfigured bodies of Russian soldiers who were captured by the Turks. The sight of them was the cause of nervous shock for many recruits. But, be that as it may, everyone had to settle down. The Russian troops numbered only about 5,000 people: they included the Oryol infantry regiment, an artillery battery, two Cossack hundreds and Bulgarian militias. The road that they were supposed to protect ran along two peaks - Mount St. Nicholas and Mount Central, separated by about one and a half kilometers. They were supposed to become the extreme points of defense. As subsequent events will show, they could well have been turned into a good fortified area, but General Nikolai Stoletov, the commander of the detachment, and senior officers treated the task without due diligence. All engineering preparations were limited only to the installation of artillery batteries as strong points of defense and the construction of an intermittent line of lodgements (trenches) for their defense. The lodgements were shallow - no more than 30 cm, so it was possible to hide in them from bullets only by sitting behind a parapet of piled stones.

There were five batteries. Two of them - “Big” (four guns) and “Small” (two guns) - were placed on the southern and western slopes of Mount St. Nicholas. Another one, “Steel” (six guns), was secured to the east. It got its name because it was equipped with six captured Turkish cannons, cast from steel (not copper) at Krupp factories. And two batteries were installed in the north: “Round” on Shipka (four guns) and “Central” (four more guns) on the mountain with the same name.

The deficiencies in the defense were obvious. From the memoirs of Staff Captain Ivan Polikarpov: “At the most superficial glance at the fortifications, it was clearly visible that they were all extremely hasty and could not pose any serious obstacles. Strictly speaking, they did not have a specific plan corresponding to the configuration of the terrain. For large detachment they were unsuitable due to lack of capacity and lack of cover for reserves. For a small one, they were extremely dangerous, because they scattered forces throughout the entire position and were not adapted to stubborn defense in parts: if the enemy captured one point, the entire position would be exposed. And finally, the fortifications themselves were of ridiculously insignificant profiles (depth – author’s note).”

In addition, Stoletov did not have enough forces to organize defense on two more peaks that controlled the area from the east and west - Malom Bedek and Lysaya Gora. Such miscalculations in the organization of defense can be explained by only one mistake: no one considered Shipka as a fortified area designed for a long siege. Everyone was expecting a quick march to the south, and the Shipkinites believed that their strategic task was not so much defense as participation in the general offensive, which would begin beyond the mountain passes. They did not expect a serious attack on Shipka and did not even really know (as at headquarters - the main apartment) where the enemy’s southern army under the command of Suleiman Pasha was located. They were waiting for her in the Tarnovo area closer to mid-August.

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Drawing based on a marching map of the military operations at Shipka Pass, compiled by artillery staff captain Ivan Polikarpov for a report to headquarters on the actions of Russian troops in the period from August 9 to 11, 1877. Russian positions on Shipka and the attacks carried out on them by the troops of Suleiman Pasha are depicted

In reality, Suleiman Pasha stood only 100 kilometers east of Shipka and intended to take the pass in the near future. At the military council, he clearly set the task: “Capture the pass in no more than 24 hours. Even if half of our army dies, it doesn’t matter. With the other half, we will be complete masters on the other side of the mountains, because Reuf Pasha will follow us, followed by Said Pasha with the militia. The Russians are waiting for us at Elena (a place near Tarnovo - author's note). Let them stay there."

Not a single Russian patrol was able to detect Suleiman’s detachments. Often, it was enough for Cossack scouts to simply climb up and inspect this or that mountain they encountered from all sides in order to notice Turkish bivouacs on its opposite slope. However, this was not done.

At the beginning of August, discordant streams of Bulgarian refugees began to flow from the south to Shipka - a sure sign that the Turks were approaching. Suleiman's 35,000-strong army approached the pass on August 7 and formed a battle formation. Stoletov immediately telegraphed General Fyodor Radetsky, the commander of the central group of Russian troops in Northern Bulgaria, who was responsible for the defense of the Shipka position: “The entire corps of Suleiman Pasha, visible to us in full view, is lined up against us eight miles from the village of Shipka (south of the Shipka Pass. — Author's note). The enemy's forces are enormous; I say this without exaggeration; We will defend ourselves to the utmost, but reinforcements are urgently needed.”

Later other telegrams with similar contents were sent. From the last telegram, sent at nine o’clock in the evening on August 8: “The entire corps of Suleiman Pasha with numerous cavalry, artillery and convoys lined up in front of the position I occupied. Tomorrow the enemy will storm Shipka. I will defend myself to the last extreme, but I consider it my duty to report that the disproportion of forces is too great. Considering our position to be very important, I ask for reinforcements."

But there were no more reinforcements. On August 8, Radetzky sent the entire reserve (4th Infantry Brigade and 2nd Brigade of the 14th Infantry Division) east to the town of Bebrovo. The day before, a report from General Ignatius Boreisha arrived from there, who reported that his troops had entered into battle with numerous enemy detachments. He could not name the exact numbers of the Turkish troops, but expressed confidence in their numbers. The general asked for reinforcements. At Radetzky's headquarters they decided that Boreysha had collided with the vanguard of Suleiman Pasha's troops. Ignoring reports from Shipka, which were much more definite than reports from Bebrovo, Radetzky ordered assistance to be sent east rather than south. Then it turned out that Boreysha was opposed by a detachment of bashi-bazouks, which could have been dealt with by one battalion. The command realized the mistake late, the situation could not be corrected: all the reinforcements that Stoletov needed so much were separated from his positions at a distance of three days of march.

Heroism and chance

The night of August 9 turned out to be sleepless for the entire Shipka garrison. According to Polikarpov, the defenders were sure that the pass could not be defended, and yet they were ready, without hesitation, to give their lives for the common cause. The first attack began at seven in the morning. Suleiman Pasha attacked the Russian positions from the eastern flank, that is, the “Steel” battery through Maly Bedek. To divert attention, he sent additional troops in a frontal attack - on Mount St. Nicholas. However, the Turks got involved in a difficult battle with the defenders of St. Nicholas, and Suleiman Pasha was forced to use the reserve in this direction, and not in the eastern direction. “Steel” was not taken thanks to the help of the “Round” and “Central” batteries: they fired grapeshot in a heap, which greatly hindered the advance of the Turks.

From the memoirs of Gabriel Kisnemsky: “The Turks are pressing forward together, moving closer and closer to us, but it is clear that every step costs them dearly. They will run a few steps and lie down behind the first available cover of the area, which does not cover the enemy at all. The Turks, like children, hiding their heads from our gaze, think that they have protected themselves from defeat on our part; but bullets and grapeshot grenades spared no one. The bravest of this attacking disorderly mass do not allow the faint-hearted to lie low for long: they jump up and quickly move forward, dragging the rest with them. Some brave souls are ahead. The guns thunder incessantly; bullets shower the enemy with hail. Both the Turks and we are making every effort. Whistling, screams, groans, signals from military horns, the roar of cannons, gun salvos - all this merged into one chaotic mass.” All five attacks that the Ottomans launched that day were repulsed. The next day, August 10, the fighting was less active; the Turks did not attack, limiting themselves to artillery shelling. The Russians were rebuilding the destroyed fortifications and waiting for help. Now there are more of them - about 7.5 thousand. It was the Bryansk regiment from Gabrovo that came to the rescue. Suleiman Pasha was also preparing fresh forces: tomorrow 25 thousand askers would go to storm Russian fortifications from three sides of the world: Rassim Pasha’s detachment was supposed to attack from the west, Salih Pasha, Rejeb Pasha and Shakir Pasha - from the south, southeast and east, and Wessel Pasha - from the northeast. “The warriors must march without interruption,” demanded Suleiman Pasha. “Even if they fall in the thousands, others will take their place.” The only signals allowed are “assembly”, “advance” and “commander killed”.

Balkan states after the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano

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The Eleventh Russian-Turkish War ended with the San Stefano Peace Treaty of February 19, 1878. The contract received its name from the place of signing - a town located near Istanbul. The main point of the agreement was the creation of a new Bulgarian state, the size of which turned out to be truly enormous: from the Danube to the Aegean Sea and from the Black Sea to Lake Ohrid. Turkish troops were withdrawn from Bulgaria, and the Russians remained for another two years. Türkiye also promised to pay Russia an indemnity in the amount of 310 million rubles

On August 11, the battle began with a frontal attack by Rejeb Pasha on the “Round” battery. At the same time, Wessel Pasha’s detachment launched an attack on Shipka Mountain. If successful, the Turks would have gone behind the defenders of the pass and cut them off from the road to Gabrovo, making it impossible to connect with reinforcements. The artillerymen of the “Round” battery, protected by only two companies, rolled out their guns behind the parapet, at direct fire, to hit the Turkish infantry, thereby leaving themselves outside the protection of the earthen fortifications. It was no longer possible to respond to the fire of the Ottoman batteries firing from Little Bedek. By three o'clock in the afternoon the situation had become critical. From the memoirs of Staff Captain Polikarpov: “The few bayonets guarding the battery were out of action wounded and killed. A handful remained, lying under the guns, exhausted to the extreme, ready to die, but no longer able to fight. The Turks, with incredible ferocity, climbed onto the battery in huge masses. Eyewitnesses will never forget the terrible devastation that our grapeshot and grape grenade caused in the enemy’s ranks. After each shot, whole piles of bodies rolled down the steep mountain into the ravine. But fresh troops, constructing ladders from the bodies of the fallen, climbed forward with indescribable ferocity and persistence. Several times they approached up to forty steps, but a volley of grapeshot turned them back. For four hours, after fruitless attacks involving terrible efforts and losses, the exhausted enemy lay down at the foot of the battery mound. The black-red piles of bodies (the dark blue uniforms of the Turks and their red fezzes. - Author's note), completely covering the heights, testified to the tenacity of the battle." Hardly half of the artillery personnel remained at the battery, and ammunition was running out. The infantrymen also ran out of ammunition, and they fought the Turks with bayonets, butts and stones. It seemed that both the attackers and the defenders had lost their minds - they grabbed each other by the throat or tried to gouge out their eyes.

Polikarpov himself was on the “Central” battery. Here was the main direction of the Turkish attack, the goal of which was to capture the Russian detachment in pincers. But even at night, the defenders took up positions on Volynskaya Mountain in order to meet the enemy at the distant approaches. Now they needed fire support in order to ease the onslaught of the endless columns of Rassim Pasha, who were attacking the Russians from Lesnaya Mountain, having a tenfold advantage in manpower. From the memoirs of Staff Captain Polikarpov: “As soon as the enemy masses appeared on Lesnaya, the battery met them with a grapeshot grenade from all four guns. Scattering shots along the entire ridge, maintaining fire constantly, meeting with volleys any attempt by the enemy to descend en masse from the ridge, the battery forced the enemy to pay too dearly for each step of the ceded space, and only it alone, according to the testimony of the entire infantry, made it possible to take a breath, wait for cartridges, settle in and pick up the countless wounded. Noticing this, all the enemy guns attacked the battery with ferocity, bombarding it with an endless number of shells. The battery was in a terrible situation, it could not respond to the enemy, since it had to fight the infantry, and he took advantage of this... The bottom of the battery, its parapet and the surrounding space, was some kind of huge earthen mass, broken and scattered in disorder. But, despite the significant decline, the battery fought desperately. This terrible struggle continued until five o'clock in the evening. All that was available - all the reserves, every free person, were sent to this terrible point (to the Volyn Mountain - author's note), and a moment later they returned wounded, or gave up the ghost for the Tsar, for the faith, for Rus' on this immortal Bagpipe."

One of the officers of the Bulgarian militia did not write about faith and the tsar: “In the middle of this hell, God, how many wounded were moaning. But who cared at those moments about their groans... We even stopped hearing the shells. The nerves had no time for them. Our entire position was under fire, and the supports provided too little protection from bullets. The ranks of units quickly thinned out. The wounded in the forward lodges remained undressed until the end of the battle due to the small number of paramedics and the inconvenience of transportation: the dressing station was too far from the battle site. The lightly wounded themselves came to be bandaged, but very often they were finished off by stray bullets. The seriously wounded were carried on stretchers by their comrades, in the absence of orderlies, whose number decreased considerably on the 9th and 10th. There have been such cases: they are carrying a wounded man, suddenly a grenade explodes and the fragments kill both the wounded man and the bearers.”

Balkan states after the signing of the Berlin Treaty

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The terms of the Treaty of San Stefano were revised at the Congress of Berlin in the summer of 1878. Since Great Britain and Austria-Hungary were not satisfied with the strengthening of Russia in the Balkans, they, threatening war, forced St. Petersburg to take part in international congress states in Berlin, convened to review the division of the borders of Western Turkey. According to the treaty signed at the congress, the borders of Bulgaria were cut in half, Austria received Bosnia and Herzegovina, and England, under a secret agreement with Turkey, was given Cyprus

For the third day, the Russian detachment was in continuous battle on bare rocks without sleep, without food and without water. The cartridges and shells were running out. Meanwhile, more and more reinforcements seemed to arrive to the Turks. But our reserve was still missing. At five o'clock, when all the officers were killed, a slow retreat began from the Volyn Mountain. Staff Captain Polikarpov took up a perimeter defense with the remaining artillerymen armed with banners. He saw how below, on the “Round” battery, servants were removing the bolts from the guns, preparing to leave the almost encircled position. But then, just like in the movies, Colonel Fyodor Depreradovich arrived in Shipka with the news that help was close. Everyone who was able to did so took the positions that had not yet been taken or stood at the guns. The last Turkish attack was repulsed. It was followed by a temporary lull: both sides were extremely tired from the battle, which lasted almost 13 hours. It was at this moment that the riflemen from Radetzky’s reserve arrived and made an accelerated forced march to the Shipka Pass. The Russian “ura” merged with the Turkish “ala-a-a”. With a bayonet attack, those who arrived in time drove the Turks back from the Volyn Mountain and took up a strong defense. This is how the battle ended on August 11, 1877.

Now Radetzky had at his disposal 20 battalions (about 20,000 bayonets), a force that could really resist Suleiman Pasha. Therefore, on August 12, Radetzky attempted to capture Bald Mountain. The battle for it lasted for two days. But the Russians were not successful: they firmly held the Volyn Mountain, but could not advance further. In response to Radetzky's request to send reinforcements, the main apartment responded that all reserves were now pulled towards the besieged Plevna. But the Turks did not have the strength to fight further, and they stopped fighting ( last Stand ended on September 5th).

In the battles for Shipka, the Ottomans lost from 6,000 to 8,000 soldiers and 234 officers in six days, the Russians - 3,640 soldiers and 131 officers. The strategic results of the battles were small: the Russians defended their position, but were left in the same unfavorable conditions as they were. The Turks, who captured Bald Mountain and Little Bedek, gained a tactical advantage. But this did not bother the Russian commander-in-chief, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who gave Radetsky an order: to keep the troops at the pass until Plevna was taken. This is how the “Shipka sitting” began.

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The Turkish Empire reached its greatest size in the 16th century, when the Sultan's troops reached Vienna. A century later, the Sublime Porte began to fade

Everything is calm on Shipka

In mid-September it began to rain, the mountain roads were in disrepair, the clay turned into a heavy wet mess that was impossible to walk or drive through. They began to try to build dugouts with stoves, that is, to cut a quadrangular depression in one of the walls of the shelter with a hole at the top for smoke. But nothing came of it: the wind drove all the smoke back into the dugout, and there was no way to stay in it. The dugouts themselves turned into reservoirs for collecting rainwater or melted snow, which flowed from the roof in the form of streams directly onto their heads. The walls were always wet, and the floors turned into a big cold puddle. The air in such structures was very humid, like in a greenhouse. Therefore, the soldiers preferred to stay in huts: at least they could breathe there. We warmed ourselves by the fires.

Winter on Shipka in 1877 began early. The Turks (they were now commanded by Wessel Pasha) took most of the troops to winter quarters south of the pass - to the village of Sheinovo. Only the advance detachment remained in the mountains, which was replaced by a new one at every set time. The Russians could not go anywhere. There were also big problems with food. In November, Radetsky reported to headquarters: “There are no crackers in Tarnovo and Gabrovo. Communication between these cities and Shipka may soon cease altogether. If a supply of crackers, cereals and alcohol is not immediately sent to Gabrovo, then the Shipka detachment is threatened with starvation. I have repeatedly communicated with the field commissariat about all this, but still there is no reserve.” They simply forgot about Shipka.

From the diary of Colonel Mikhail Dukhonin: “December 7th. Frost 20 degrees, strong snowstorm, straight snow hurricane; everything is covered with snow; on level ground the snow depth is ¾ arshin (50 cm), and the sediment is up to 1.5 fathoms (3 m). Everyone has armed themselves with shovels and is digging out their homes, and what the soldiers who are in the open trenches on Mount St. Nicholas experience is beyond all description. I walked around the posts in the snow above my knees: I had to dig a path from post to post. During the day, 272 people fell ill. By December 8, the total number of sick people in the entire detachment defending Shipka was 90 officers and 6,034 lower ranks. December 15. On Mount St. Nicholas. The change of battalions was carried out safely, there was a strong snowstorm all night that blinded our eyes, and people spent the whole night at work, digging out of drifts. The clothes are frozen, become hard and restrict movement. What increases the danger of chills is that falling people cannot get up on their own. To keep their clothes soft, people covered themselves with tent sheets; it was still less freezing under them. To keep warm, people run near the trenches.” Fedor Fedorovich Radetsky (1820-1890) arrived in Shipka on the evening of August 11. The next day he personally led the troops with bayonets. For the defense of the pass he was awarded a gold sword with diamonds with the inscription: “For the defense of Shipka from August 9 to 14, 1877.” Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev (1843-1882) became a real hero of the Russian-Turkish war. He distinguished himself during the capture of Plevna, and near Lovcha, and near Sheinovo. It was he who was the first to reach Adrianople, planning to move on the Turkish capital, if not for the news of the signed truce Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (1831-1891) was the commander of the Russian army in the Balkans. He led the last, successful assault on Plevna on November 28, 1877. Signed a truce with the Turks on January 19, 1878 in Adrianople. At the end of the war he was awarded the rank of general and field marshal. Joseph Vladimirovich Gurko (1828-1901) was the head of the advanced detachment of the Russian army. On July 5, 1877, he attacked Shipka from the south, but had no success and retreated. However, the Turks, frightened by his actions, soon abandoned their positions at the pass.

There was no way to get warm clothes. From a soldier’s memoirs: “Barely covered from the cold, you used to stand the whole night until the morning; In the evening, with thick fog, it would begin to drizzle, and by morning there would be frost, from which everything would freeze. Overcoats that are wet from the evening become like crinolines, in which it is not only difficult to move freely, but also difficult to turn around; all your limbs will become numb, and you will feel some kind of aching pain in your legs, head and arms. The frosts themselves were not so severe, but with them a strong, piercing wind makes you numb. Often people were brought from the chain with frostbitten limbs, half dead or completely frozen; The chain and stay on St. Nicholas, the highest point of the position, were especially terrible: dozens of people were freezing there - it’s hard to believe, but it’s a fact.” It was at this time that Radetzky sent optimistic reports to headquarters: “Everything is calm on Shipka,” meaning not only the lack of enemy activity, but also the mood in the troops. Of course, the Russian soldier will endure everything.

On November 28, Plevna surrendered. At the military council in the main apartment, it was decided to cross the Balkan ridge and develop an offensive against Istanbul. Here they remembered Shipka again. It was ordered to prepare. The plan was as follows: Radetzky, with a frontal attack on Turkish positions on the Shipka Pass, distracts the enemy’s attention while two columns - the western (through the Imitli Pass) and the eastern (through the Travna Pass) - surround the Turkish winter quarters in Sheynov, south of Shipka. Radetzky criticized this plan, saying that a frontal attack on prepared Turkish positions, especially in winter, would bring too many losses, and he abdicated all responsibility for the consequences if the plan was carried out. But Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich ignored his opinion.

At dawn on December 24, the western column (Dmitry Skobelev) and the eastern column (Nikolai Svyatopolk-Mirsky) began the operation. But due to difficult weather conditions, Skobelev’s soldiers were unable to reach the intended bridgehead on time, and Svyatopolk-Mirsky’s troops were forced to attack alone on December 27. Against 30 Russian battalions, the Turks had 20, but had superiority in artillery. In the evening after the battle, Svyatopolk-Mirsky telegraphed Radetsky: “The troops fought like lions all day long; the losses are large; retreat is impossible; nothing is known about Skobel; help out, there is little ammunition and food; we took 2 guns and 100 prisoners.” On the morning of December 28, Radetzky summoned Dukhonin and showed him the telegram. From the diary of Colonel Dukhonin: “When the dispatch was read, General Radetzky announced that he did not expect that we would have to attack from the front, but since the moment had come to help out our comrades dying below, we must help them, at least at the cost of Shipka’s attack in the forehead. Then it was ordered to prepare the regiment for attack in half an hour..."

At the appointed time, General Radetzky gave the order to advance: “With God, help out your comrades. The more energetically you attack the fortification on the highway, the more battalions you will attract to yourself and, therefore, distract from the battle below. The better and more surely it will be achieved common goal their earnings. Don’t delay, get started, God will help you.” The Podolsk, Bryansk and Zhitomir regiments began their descent at noon. When the Podolsk regiment approached the Turkish redoubts, it was met with heavy fire from rifles and cannons. The first line of attackers lay down completely. The rest rushed to the bayonet line. They captured the front line of trenches, but were soon driven out. The attack failed. But the efforts of Radetzky’s troops were not in vain. A little earlier, Skobelev’s battalions finally went on the offensive from the west to Sheinovo, and the distracting maneuver of the Shipkinites served the general well. At two o'clock in the afternoon, Skobelev's troops captured Sheinovo and met with the troops of Svyatopolk-Mirsky. Wessel Pasha's army capitulated. An hour later, the white flag was thrown out by the troops of Osman Pasha, who were defending the Shipka Pass. 22,000 people with 83 guns, 3 pashas and 765 officers surrendered. Skobelev immediately ordered a double portion of food to be prepared, telling the soldiers: “Beat the enemy without mercy, as long as you hold the weapon in your hands. But as soon as he surrendered, he asked for aman, he became a prisoner - he is your friend and brother. If you don’t eat it yourself, give it to him.” “I can safely say,” Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich became emotional, “that the glorious defense of the Shipka Pass could not have ended in a more brilliant manner.”

With the crossing of the Balkans, the Russian army began a rapid pursuit of the enemy. Radetzky's troops moved at an accelerated march to Adrianople (Edirne). Near Philippopolis (now Plovdiv), the troops of General Gurko defeated the troops of Suleiman Pasha. On January 8, the Russian vanguard reached Adrianople, which the Turks surrendered without a fight. There were 15 kilometers left to Istanbul. Türkiye asked for peace.

The drama of the Shipka epic was largely the result of a number of mistakes by the Russian command. First, they incorrectly chose and poorly strengthened the defensive position, then they failed to detect the enemy in time, and as a result, they strategically misused the reserve. In the autumn and winter, it was not possible to satisfactorily organize the supply of those who participated in the “sitting”, which led to unjustified losses: if during the August battles the Russian army lost about 4,000 people, then in the winter up to 11,000 soldiers were out of action from frostbite and pneumonia. From a tactical point of view, the summer defense of Shipka certainly helped the Russian troops take Plevna: after all, taking the blow of the entire army of Suleiman Pasha means something. But the frontal winter offensive of Radetsky’s troops was a waste of manpower, which could have been completely dispensed with if the actions of Svyatopolk-Mirsky and Skobelev had been better coordinated. This picture does not entirely agree with the image of the Shipka operation that official historiography offered us. But in life everything is always more prosaic and meaningless than it later seems.

Illustrations Victoria Semykina, Oksana Alekseevskaya

Coursework on the History of Romania

On the topic “Defense of Shipka”

Completed : Verbulsky Vladimir

Supervisor : Ukhanova Olga Antonovna

Chisinau, 2003

Plan:

1. Introduction

2. Going on defense

3. August battles

4. Shipka seat

5. Conclusion

6. List of used literature

1. Introduction

...The day of the beginning of the last Russian-Turkish war was approaching. On April 12 (24), 1877, in Chisinau on the Skakov field, a manifesto was read out on Russia’s declaration of war on Porte. He was listened to, as contemporaries wrote, with tears in their eyes by the soldiers of three squads of the Bulgarian militia, standing in the same ranks with Russian soldiers, to march across the Danube, for the liberation of their Slavic brothers.

“To the detachments of the Bulgarian militias, formed in Chisinau in 1876-1877 and valiantly fought together with the Russian army for the liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke”.

Soon after the parade, the troops moved to the front. In memory of this event, a bronze memorial sign was unveiled in a solemn ceremony in 1983 in Chisinau. The date is cast on it - April 24, 1877. Under the bronze memorial sign there is a plaque with the inscription: “In honor of the farewell of Russian troops and Bulgarian militias who departed from the Chisinau station on April 24, 1877 to participate in the liberation of the peoples of the Balkans from the Ottoman yoke.”

Bulgarian historian I. Stoychev wrote: “The Bulgarian People's Army was born in Chisinau. Its foundation was laid here in the Armenian Compound and the Skakov Field.”

The population of Bessarabia took an active part in preparing for the war. Moldovans, Ukrainians, and Bulgarians provided all possible assistance to the Russian army. In Chisinau, Tiraspol, Bendery, Orhei, Balti, in the Capriana Monastery, and in a number of villages, dozens of infirmaries were located, which from the very first days of hostilities received wounded soldiers. Voluntary collections of money, food, and clothing for participants in the liberation campaign were carried out everywhere. On April 16 (28), 1877, it was decided to build in Chisinau ‘disabled’ a home for soldiers wounded in the war. The first donations for its construction came from the working people. This fundraiser is called 'penny'.

In the summer of 1877, active hostilities began. The Russian army crossed the Danube and soon captured the cities of Sistovo and Tarnovo and began the siege of Pleven. A detachment of Russian-Bulgarian troops under the command of General I.V. Turco headed to Southern Bulgaria.

Fierce fighting broke out at the Shipka Pass, where 6,000 Russian soldiers and Bulgarian militias confronted selected units of the Turkish troops. The famous defense of Shipka began, ending in the complete victory of the Russian troops.

2. Going on defense

By the beginning of August 1877, the Danube Army had 268 thousand people and over 1 thousand guns. The main forces consisted of three detachments - Western (45 thousand people and 208 guns), Southern (48.5 thousand people and 195 guns) and Rushchuksky (56 thousand people and 224 guns). There were 10 thousand people in the strategic reserve. There was one division (10 thousand people) on the way. The remaining troops were part of the Lower Danube and Zhurzhevo-Oltenitsky detachments.

By that time, the Turkish command had managed to concentrate over 200 thousand people and 387 guns against the Danube Army. In the area of ​​Plevna, Lovcha, Sofia, the West Danube Army of Osman Pasha (64 thousand people and 108 guns) was located. The quadrangle of fortresses was occupied by the East Danube army of Mehmet Ali Pasha (99 thousand people and 216 guns). The southern army of Suleiman Pasha (about 37 thousand people and 63 guns) was concentrated south of the Balkans. Thus, in infantry and cavalry the forces were approximately equal, and in artillery the Russians outnumbered the enemy by 2.5 times. A significant drawback of the Turkish army was that a significant part of the troops were in fortresses; no more than 100-120 thousand people could be allocated for operations in the field. Nevertheless, the enemy troops also had an important advantage: they covered the Russian army, stretched out on a wide front, on three sides.

The leaders of the Turkish army developed a plan to encircle the Russians through a concentric offensive of three armies in the general direction of Sistovo. The army of Suleiman Pasha was supposed to capture the Shipka Pass and cross the Balkans. The West Danube Army of Osman Pasha was tasked with holding the Plevna fortified area until Shipka was captured. The East Danube Army of Mehmet Ali Pasha had to actively ensure the Southern Army's capture of the Shipka Pass. The implementation of this plan would put the Russian army in a dangerous position. But the Turks did not have unity in the leadership of their troops. Mehmet Ali Pasha was only nominally the commander-in-chief, but in fact the army commanders acted independently.

The general situation in the Balkan theater of operations was not in favor of the Danube Army. Its offensive in divergent directions led to the dispersion of forces, and interaction between individual detachments was disrupted. The reserves were used up. A well-developed war plan turned out to be unsustainable. The position of the Russian army was further worsened by the unsuccessful assaults on Plevna.

YES. Milyutin, in a note to Alexander II dated July 21 (August 2), 1877, soberly assessed the current situation: “...Turkey, which seemed so close to complete collapse... still retains much vitality and possesses large military resources with powerful foreign support. In terms of tactics, we cannot always conduct a battle by rushing openly, boldly, directly at the enemy, even those who are incomparably superior in strength, especially when he has managed to gain a foothold. If we always continue to always count on the boundless selflessness and courage of the Russian soldier, then short time Let's destroy our entire magnificent army. In terms of strategic, obviously, one can no longer hope to be able to, with one quick, bold raid forward beyond the Balkans... create panic in the enemy army and people, and in a few weeks, under the walls of his capital itself, sign peace terms for him... The matter cannot be corrected. Otherwise, by abandoning offensive enterprises for a while, until stronger reinforcements arrive, gather the scattered forces into a small number of points, take advantageous positions and, where necessary, fortify.” This proposal was approved by Alexander II, and on July 22 (August 3) he sent a note from Milutin to the commander-in-chief with a note: “It seems to me that its conclusion is quite correct, and therefore, if you also share it, then you must begin to execute it immediately and provide yourself with strongly fortified positions on all sides and wait for suitable reinforcements in them before thinking about a further offensive.”

Having decided to go on the defensive along the entire front, the Russian command paid special attention to holding the passes through the Balkan mountain range. The passes were defended by the Russian Southern detachment under the command of F.F. Radetzky, dispersed in small groups over an area of ​​120 km. Of the total number of the detachment, 48.5 thousand people and 66 guns located near Tarnovo made up the reserve. It was headed by M.I. Dragomirov. The main idea of ​​General Radetzky was that with a timely maneuver, the forces could give them the strongest possible rebuff in any foreseeable offensive of the Turks.

On the morning of August 8 (20), Radetzky began moving the general reserve to the left flank of his detachment. This was a big mistake. Suleiman Pasha struck not in the northeast, but in the north - through the Shipka Pass, in the area of ​​​​which a small Russian-Bulgarian detachment was defending. The detachment included the 36th Oryol Infantry Regiment, five squads of the Bulgarian militia, four hundred Cossacks, three special teams, three batteries and one half-battery. The number of these troops was 6 thousand people with 27 guns. The detachment was commanded by the leader of the Bulgarian militia, Major General N.G. Stoletov.

On August 7 (19), he telegraphed Radetzky: “The entire corps of Suleiman Pasha, visible to us in full view, is arrayed against us eight miles from Shipka. The enemy's forces are enormous; I say this without exaggeration; We will defend ourselves to the extreme, but reinforcements are absolutely urgently needed... The enemy, if he does not decide to attack us at night, will certainly follow with a general attack at dawn. We had already fired at the approaching columns; I repeat once again, everything is playing out here, the disproportion of forces is very great... The ship is too important for the army to be risked.” But these messages were not taken into account.

The position on Shipka, defended by Stoletov’s detachment, extended up to 2 km in length and from 60 to 1 thousand meters in width. There was a road along the crest of the mountain ridge. The general character of this pass is an open defile, running along narrow ridges, bounded to the west and east by steep, steep slopes into deep valleys covered with dense forest and bushes. The fortifications of the Shipka Pass could be bypassed from both the east and the west. The position was surrounded by mountain peaks. She could be shot at from all sides.

The Russian-Bulgarian detachment carried out significant engineering work in a short time. Full-profile trenches in one and two rows were dug along the entire front; forest debris, wolf pits, and land mines were placed in the most dangerous directions. Much attention was paid to the construction of fortifications on the hills surrounding the pass. Three artillery batteries were equipped on Mount St. Nicholas - Big, Small and Steel.

Suleiman Pasha, well understanding the significance of the Shipka Pass, called it ‘the heart of the Balkans’ And ‘the key to the doors of Bulgaria’. On August 8 (20), a plan was adopted at the military council: demonstrating with part of the forces an attack on the Shipka position from the south, with the main forces striking from the east. Suleiman Pasha set the task: “Capture the pass no later than in 24 hours. Even if half of our army dies, it doesn’t matter. On the other half, we will be complete masters on the other side of the mountains, because Reuf Pasha will follow us, followed by Said Pasha with the militia. The Russians are waiting for us at Elena. Let them stay there. By the time they get here, we will be in Tarnovo for a long time.”

The main blow was to be delivered by a detachment under the command of Rejeb Pasha (10 thousand people and 6 guns), and an auxiliary detachment of Shakir Pasha without artillery numbering 2 thousand people. The remaining forces and means remained at the village of Shipka in the general reserve of Suleiman Pasha. Thus, against 6 thousand people and 27 Russian guns, Suleiman Pasha allocated 12 thousand people and 6 guns, ensuring numerical superiority in manpower by 2 times, but being inferior to the Russians in artillery by more than 4 times.

On the night of August 9 (21), the columns of Rejeb Pasha and Shakir Pasha entered their original areas. But their attempts to conduct an attack under the cover of battery fire were not crowned with success: Russian artillerymen disabled enemy guns with accurate shooting, providing great assistance to the infantry in repelling the enemy’s advance. Throughout the day the superiority was on the Russian side.

Despite the lack of necessary artillery fire support, Rejeb Pasha launched his detachment on the offensive. Following him, the detachment of Shakir Pasha began to attack. The enemy advanced in dense closed columns with sparse chains of riflemen in front. The most stubborn battles began in the direction of the enemy's auxiliary attack. The defenders of Mount St. Nicholas repulsed the first attack with heavy losses for the enemy. Then Suleiman Pasha gave the order: “Warriors must go to the Crow’s Nest without interruption. Even if they fall in the thousands, others will take their place. The only signals allowed are: ‘gathering’, ‘offensive’ and ‘chief killed’.”

Following the order of the army commander, Shakir Pasha resumed the offensive. Six attacks were launched during the day. And each time the Russians repulsed them with artillery and rifle fire, often turning into bayonet counterattacks. When there was not enough ammunition, piles of stones fell on the enemy. By evening, the enemy, having failed to achieve success, stopped attacks.

The offensive of Rejeb Pasha's detachment, which launched eight attacks, ended equally unsuccessfully.

The battle on August 9 (21) ended in complete failure for the army of Suleiman Pasha. Russian and Bulgarian soldiers held their positions.

The next day passed relatively calmly. The enemy did not launch any attacks; both sides exchanged artillery and rifle fire. The strength of the Shipka defenders increased somewhat. Even in the midst of the battle, reinforcements approached them - the 35th Bryansk Infantry Regiment with a platoon of the Don Cossack Battery. Now Stoletov’s detachment numbered 9 thousand people and 29 guns. In addition, Radetsky, having received a message about the transition of Suleiman Pasha’s army to the offensive on Shipka, sent his reserve there - the 4th Infantry Brigade and the 2nd Brigade of the 14th Infantry Division, led by M.I. Dragomirov. He himself also went to Shipka.

The enemy was also very actively preparing for the new battle. During the day of August 10 (22) and the night of August 11 (23), he erected a number of batteries. The Turkish command developed a new offensive plan. It was decided to attack the Russians simultaneously from all sides, surround them, and then, depending on the situation, capture or destroy them. Five detachments were allocated for the offensive. The detachment of Rassim Pasha was supposed to attack from the west, the detachments of Salih Pasha, Rejeb Pasha and Shakir Pasha from the south, southeast and east; Wessel Pasha's detachment was intended to carry out the main task: advancing in the direction of Uzun-Kush, to reach the Russian rear and complete the offensive. Against 9 thousand people and 29 guns, the Russian enemy now fielded 17.5 thousand people and 34 guns, ensuring a numerical superiority of almost 2 times in manpower and equality in artillery.

On the night of August 11 (23), the Turkish detachments intended for the offensive took their starting position. At dawn, their artillery opened fire on the Shipka position. The enemy sought to suppress Russian batteries in order to prepare an attack by his infantry. Having a large supply of shells, the Turks fired frequent volleys. The Russians returned fire, but due to a lack of ammunition they limited themselves to targeted shooting - single shots. An artillery duel ensued along the entire front.

Under the cover of artillery fire, Turkish troops went on the offensive. On the morning of August 11 (23), when the battle was in full swing, General Stoletov advanced two half-companies of infantry and half a battery of mountain artillery to Uzun-Kush. The Russians built a battery there, called Tylnaya. This strengthened the rear positions of the Russian-Bulgarian detachment.

In all directions the enemy met stubborn resistance from the Russians. By 12 o'clock all his attacks had failed. The defenders of Shipka showed true heroism. The soldiers defending on Mount St. Nicholas, as on August 9 (21), lacked ammunition, which forced them to fight back with stones. One of the participants in the battle wrote: “Encouraged by this silence on our part, the enemy rushed with the greatest courage towards the rocks and the Steel Battery and came quite close to our trenches, the defenders of which at that time had almost no ammunition. What's left to do? The First Rifle Company of the Bryansk Regiment and the Third Rifle Company of the Oryol Regiment jumped out of their cradle and, shouting “hurray,” showered the attacker with a hail of stones. Despite these strange shells, the Turks could not stand it and retreated.”

Although the first onslaught of the enemy was repulsed, the position of the Russian-Bulgarian detachment was extremely difficult. There were almost no reserves. Shells and cartridges were running out. The warriors were tormented by thirst and hunger. The enemy did not lack either ammunition or food. “In small lodgements captured from the Turks, - wrote a participant in the war, - There were huge reserves of ammunition, which, given Russian economy, would have been enough for all the fortifications. Thanks to this, the Turks literally bombarded the Russians with bullets, not particularly caring about shooting accuracy. There was a significant difference in the soldiers' diet. The Turkish fortifications occupied by the Russians contained rich supplies of rice, lamb, flour, various fruits and vegetables. The Russian soldier, of course, did not dare to dream of anything like that.”

Soon the detachments of Rassim Pasha, Shakir Pasha and Wessel Pasha resumed their offensive, supported by the fire of all batteries. The detachments of Salih Pasha and Rejeb Pasha, who had previously suffered heavy losses, did not participate in the offensive. Shipka's defenders met the attackers with rifle fire and energetic counterattacks. The Russian batteries, not responding to Turkish artillery fire, opened fire on the advancing enemy infantry. The Turks suffered great losses, but continued to move forward. The troops of Rassim Pasha managed to come close to the Russian positions from the west, capture Volynskaya Mountain and start a fight for Central Mountain. The troops of Shakir Pasha and Wessel Pasha reached the Russian positions from the southeast and east. The Russian-Bulgarian detachment was almost surrounded. Only the narrow isthmus at the Rear Battery remained in his hands, connecting the Shipka position with the road to Gabrovo.

At this critical moment, the Fourth Rifle Brigade from Radetzky’s reserve approached Shipka, making a difficult march in 38-degree heat along dusty roads clogged with convoys of Bulgarian refugees. Overcoming all difficulties, the Russians persistently strove south, hastening to warn the enemy in his efforts to capture the pass . “As we approach the refugee camps, - Anuchin wrote, -the entire adult population knelt down and bowed to the ground. “A lot of health, a lot of happiness!” the women repeated with sobs, looking at us. All the men were without hats. Many men, women and children were in bandages. These are the victims of Turkish furies. The picture was amazing.” To help the Russian soldiers, “100 stretchers with 400 porters were assembled... A thousand Bulgarians were sent with water in jugs, buckets and barrels on donkeys and carts... The local residents behaved amazingly. At the first word, the refugees overturned their carts with their belongings and rode or walked where they were ordered.”

The introduction of fresh forces into the battle decided the fight in favor of the Russians. They reoccupied Mount Volynskaya. The enemy stopped attacks and retreated to the starting line. Shipka's defenders highly appreciated the role of the shooters. One of them said: “The arrows simply amazed us, and we, seeing them in the attack, did not want to believe our eyes that these lions, who had barely moved their legs the day before during the campaign, and some of them were brought to Gabrovo on carts, were the same people.”

On the night of August 12 (24), the remaining units of the general reserve approached Shipka (the head of the reserve, M.I. Dragomirov, was wounded in the leg on August 12 (24) and was out of action until the end of the war) - 2nd Brigade of the 14th Infantry Division with the 3rd battery of the 14th artillery brigade. The number of Russian troops on Shipka increased to 14.2 thousand people and 39 guns. The defense crisis is finally over. Shells, cartridges and hot food were brought to the position.

Although the Russians repelled enemy attacks, their position continued to be difficult. The heights of Lysaya and Lesnoy Kurgan from the west, and Maly Bedek, Demir Tepe and Demievits from the east, hanging over the flanks of the Shipka position, remained in the hands of the enemy, who kept under fire not only the Russian position, but also the approaches to it from the rear. According to the defenders themselves, “all the favorable chances that fate has ever given in war were on the side of the Turks at Shipka.” The enemy, having no information about the approach of fresh Russian reserves to Shipka, continued attacks until the middle of the day on August 12 (24), when Radetzky himself launched counterattacks, trying to occupy the flank heights fortified by the enemy. For three days there were stubborn battles with varying success. The forest mound changed hands twice.

On August 13 (25), Russian units, as a result of a rapid attack, supported by fire from the Central, Round and Big Batteries, knocked the enemy off the Lesnoy Kurgan and came close to Mount Lysaya. However, the artillery could not reliably support infantry advancing beyond its firing range. Met by strong rifle and artillery fire and enemy counterattacks from Mount Lysaya, the Russians were forced to first retreat to the Lesnoy Kurgan, and then to Mount Volynskaya, where they gained a foothold. The six-day battles for the Shipka Pass are over.

During the fighting, residents of Bulgarian villages provided great assistance to the Russian troops. They carried the wounded from the battlefield and delivered water and food to their positions. A combat participant wrote: “From a distance, several tens of miles away, they came with mules or donkeys to serve as water carriers... In jugs and barrels tied to the straps, these volunteers spent whole days going down with their donkeys and mules into the valleys where there were clean and cold springs, and again returned to the mountain peaks, to their positions. However, with all the desire, each of them could make no more than two ascents during the day. But even under such conditions, they delivered more than 6,000 buckets of clean and cold water. The Bulgarian water carriers did not pay the slightest attention to the bullets with which the Turks showered them on the open road. They calmly stopped to give the animals a rest, smoked, talked... The Russian soldiers became very attached to these glorious people and tried in every possible way to express their gratitude to them.” Another eyewitness says: “During the entire time of Suleiman’s attacks, they carried water and the wounded and served the troops as best they could, despite the danger. Quite a few of them died here.” War correspondent N. Karazin reported that “during the hot battle near Shipka, in the side gorges, closer to the battlefield, where cold springs ooze, Bulgarian children with jugs crowded. They collect water and drag it to the batteries, quickly spend this moisture and quickly run for a new burden.” This assistance greatly contributed to the success of the struggle of the Russian-Bulgarian detachment against the superior forces of Suleiman Pasha.

The fighting on Shipka was very intense. Both sides suffered significant damage. The Russians and Bulgarians lost 3,640 people killed, wounded and missing, the Turks - 8,246 people, and according to some sources, 12 thousand people. Russian losses amounted to 24 percent of the total number of those who took part in the battles, and Turks - 46.5 percent of the available strength of Suleiman Pasha's army. The enemy decided to go on the defensive until reinforcements arrived.

At the height of the fighting on Shipka, the East Danube Army of Mehmet Pasha was not active. She waited for Suleiman Pasha to capture the pass, so that she could then take part in the general offensive against the Russians, as was provided for in the plan. When the attack on the Shipka stronghold failed, Mehmet Ali Pasha on August 24 (September 5) independently launched an offensive against the Rushchuk detachment. The Turks managed to push back the advanced units of the Russians, but they were unable to build on their success. On September 10 (22), the order was given to withdraw to their original positions.

The August battles solved an important strategic task - holding the Shipka Pass. The offensive of one of the enemy’s best armies was repelled by a small Russian-Bulgarian detachment that heroically resisted. The plan for a concentric offensive against the Danube Army, developed by the Turkish command, failed. The failure had a negative impact on the morale of the Sultan's troops. On the contrary, the victory of the Russian and Bulgarian soldiers strengthened their faith in their own strength. In the joint struggle against a common enemy, the friendship of the two fraternal peoples became even stronger.

The most important condition that ensured victory was the high fighting qualities of the Russian and Bulgarian soldiers. The skilful actions of the military leaders were of great importance. It should be noted the outstanding role of N.G. Stoletov, who led the troops well and supported them in difficult moments of battle.

4. “Shipka seat.”

By the beginning of September, the Shipka detachment included 27 battalions (including 7 squads of the Bulgarian militia), 13 squadrons and hundreds and 10 batteries. Its total strength reached 19,685 people with 79 guns. Against these troops, the enemy had 55 battalions, 19 squadrons and hundreds and 8 batteries with a total number of 26,270 people with 51 guns. At the end of October, the 24th Infantry Division was included in the Shipka detachment. The army of Suleiman Pasha did not receive reinforcements. The forces of the parties became approximately equal. Russian and Turkish troops went on the defensive. The period of the so-called ‘Shipka sitting’ began.

The Russian-Bulgarian detachment had the task of firmly holding the pass. While carrying it out, he did significant work to improve the defense. New batteries were erected, trenches, trenches, and communication passages were dug. In the most dangerous directions, the approaches to the fortifications were covered with various kinds of obstacles. From the end of August to mid-November, 25 thousand rounds, over 4 thousand fascines and more than 7 thousand pieces of knurling gear were delivered to the position. At the same time, dugouts, dugouts and other shelters for personnel were built.

To improve troop control, the position was divided into four areas; each of them was divided into sections. The area was designed for one or two regiments, the area for an infantry battalion. The commanders of regiments and battalions were respectively the commanders of those regions and sectors where their troops were located. The head of the position was General F.F. Radetzky.

In order to streamline the leadership of the artillery, a district artillery chief was appointed from among the battery commanders. All artillery was under the control of the artillery chief of the Shipka position. The batteries received a single numbering. At the beginning of September, positions were equipped for mortar battery No. 1 on the northern slopes of Mount St. Nicholas and mortar battery No. 2 on the northern slopes of Shipka. Each had two 6-inch (152 mm) rifled mortars. By the end of December there were 45 guns in position.

The disadvantage of the Shipka position was that the enemy covered it in a semicircle. In addition, many heights were in the hands of the enemy, which allowed him to fire at the position from all sides. “We had no rear... no flanks, almost no front”, recalled military engineer Ts.A., a participant in Shipka’s defense. Cui, future famous Russian composer.

Suleiman Pasha decided, using the advantageous location of his troops, to demoralize the defenders of the Shipka Pass with continuous shelling. First of all, the fire was directed at the Russian batteries. The shelling caused great damage: the defenders of Shipka lost people, making work to improve the defense extremely difficult.

On September 5 (17), the enemy launched an offensive with the aim of capturing highest point pass-Eagle's Nest. The Turks went into battle drunk. With a surprise attack they managed to occupy the Eagle's Nest. His defenders stood until the end. By 2 p.m., the Russians pushed back the enemy with a counterattack from fresh reserves.

In the following days, the Turks repeatedly went on the offensive. They paid great attention to the element of surprise. The attacks on September 30 (October 12) and November 9 (21) were especially strong. But the enemy’s intentions were revealed in a timely manner, and he failed to achieve his goal. The attacks were repulsed. Russian artillerymen did a lot for the stability of the defense. At first they fired directly, but it soon became clear that this was not enough. Then gradually other methods began to be used: shooting at a target invisible from the battery and shooting at night. This innovation was the undoubted merit of Russian artillerymen.

In the second half of November, severe winter set in, and military operations on Shipka stopped. Most of Suleiman Pasha's army was withdrawn to Sheinovo for winter quarters. The danger of surprise attacks is almost over. However, the position of Shipka's defenders did not improve. The difficult period of winter has begun ‘Shipka seat’. Even earlier, local residents talked about the possibility of spending the winter on the tops of the Shipka Pass, and talked about autumn and winter storms, often lasting for weeks. At first, the troops treated these stories with some distrust, considering them exaggerated, but they soon became convinced of their truth.

The Russian command did not take good care of the supply of troops. There were frequent interruptions in the supply of food and fodder. Usually food was delivered in cauldrons mounted on the fronts of food carts. Often she was completely cold, almost frozen. When there was ice, it was not possible to deliver the boilers to the positions; then they brought only meat and water on packs. “In the dark, along slippery, steep paths, climbing rocks, people fell, knocked over food and even lost their pots. Over time, the established icy conditions stopped any possibility of supplying food, and therefore, from mid-November, it was decided to satisfy people with canned food.” Head of the Shipka position F.F. Radetzky reported to the commander-in-chief at the beginning of November: “There are no crackers in Tarnovo and Gabrovo; Communication between these cities and Shipka may soon cease altogether. If a two-month supply of crackers, cereals and alcohol is not immediately sent to Gabrovo, then the Shipka detachment... is threatened with starvation... I have repeatedly talked about all this with the field commissariat, but there is still no supply.”

Things were not going well with the supply of people with shoes and uniforms. In winter, felt boots and short fur coats were required. They were delivered to Shipka late, only in the spring, and moreover, not all troops were provided with them. “The clothing of the lower ranks began to freeze to the body, forming a hard, icy crust, so that not only the overcoats, but also the pants of the sick and wounded had to be cut with a knife; the overcoats were frozen so tightly that without outside help it was impossible to unscrew the floors: they did not bend, but broke; Only with great effort could one bend the arm. When a snowstorm arose, a thick layer of ice grew so quickly from the wind that it was barely possible to move; a person who had fallen down could not get up without outside help, then in a few minutes he was covered in snow and had to be dug out.”

Difficulties in delivering materials and fuel and rocky soil did not allow the construction of comfortable dugouts. “These dugouts, dug along the slopes of the mountains, were something terrible,- recalls Borozdin. - When people huddled in them (usually as many as could fit on the floor, body close to body), it became quite warm. Then the walls and ceiling began to ‘come away’, moisture seeped out from everywhere, and after two or three hours people were lying in the water. Wet to the bones, they went out into the cold, and... one can imagine what they must have felt at that time. It happened that thawed layers of earth fell on the sleeping people, and then people had to be dug up, and often blue corpses were pulled out.” War participant L.N. Sobolev wrote: “It is impossible to light a fire in any trench; the clothes of all officers and soldiers look like one continuous ice crust (for example, you can’t untie your caps; when you try to do this, pieces of it fall off).” He calls ‘Shipka seat’ epic of a Russian soldier and cites an excerpt from the report of Colonel M.L. Dukhonin, commandant of Mount St. Nicholas, dated December 17 (29), 1877, which, in his opinion, gives the most accurate picture of the continuous drama that took place on Shipka. “On the night of the 16th to the 17th, a snow storm arose, reaching the level of a hurricane on the upper rocks of Mount St. Nicholas. The battalions of the 55th and 56th Infantry Regiments climbed the mountain in single file with the greatest difficulty; the guides could barely find their lodges in the snow storm and bring the companies... Returning from the shift, the 1st company of the 55th regiment in full force was knocked down by a whirlwind of wind and rolled away. People, somehow holding each other, stood up...” Such snowstorms happened quite often in Shipka. During blizzards and blizzards, guns often malfunctioned. Unit commanders reported: “In real severe frosts it is difficult to shoot from Berdan rifles; the trigger does not release and misfires; the oil hardens, the valves have to be taken out and kept in your pocket.”

Difficult conditions led to a huge increase in morbidity and frequent frostbite, which significantly reduced the combat effectiveness of the troops. So, for example, in the 24th Infantry Division during a two-month ‘Shipka seat’ The regiments lost (not counting the killed and wounded): Irkutsk regiment - 46.3 percent of personnel, Yenisei regiment - 65 percent, Krasnoyarsk regiment - 59 percent, which averaged 56 percent for the division. The division was declared unfit for combat, moved to the rear for reorganization and did not take part in hostilities until the end of the war.

V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, who participated in the war as a war correspondent, reported: “In the wretched Gabrovo Cathedral... lay rows of soldiers of the 24th division. These were the frozen martyrs of Shipka... Frozen because no one thought about them, because no one cared about their lives. Sharkers, phrase-mongers, careerists didn’t care about these hundreds of our... workers.”

A similar picture was observed in other parts of the Shipka detachment. During the period of defense, combat losses amounted to 4 thousand people, and losses of hospitalized sick and frostbite people during the same time were about 11 thousand people. The main reasons for the losses were the callous attitude of the tsarist generals towards the soldier. The headquarters of the Danube Army showed little interest in what was happening on Shipka. The Tsar and his entourage did nothing to alleviate the fate of the Russian heroes. Minister of War D.A. Milyutin could only write bitterly in his diary about the disappointing situation on Shipka: “... snow has already fallen in the mountains, and our poor soldiers are completely ragged.”

And although the Russian soldiers experienced incredible hardships, Radetzky’s reports to the commander-in-chief invariably repeated the reassuring phrase: “Everything is calm on Shipka.” She brought the artist V.V. Vereshchagin's idea to paint a picture. The painter depicted a lonely figure of a sentry in an overcoat and cap, freezing under a snowstorm. “Everything is calm on Shipka...”

5. Conclusion.

The defense of the Shipka Pass lasted about six months, from July 7 (19) to December 28, 1877 (January 11, 1878). The Russians, in close collaboration with the Bulgarians, repelled numerous attacks from a superior enemy, withstood intense artillery fire, endured the trials of a harsh mountain winter, and ultimately held the pass. They honorably completed a task of strategic importance, preventing the army of Suleiman Pasha from breaking through into Northern Bulgaria. Thus, favorable conditions were created for the continuation of the struggle for Plevna, as well as for the subsequent offensive of the Danube Army across the Balkans to Constantinople. The defense of Shipka went down in history as a symbol of the courage and heroism of the soldiers of Russia and Bulgaria, their close brotherhood in arms. In the battle area, a monument was erected to Russian soldiers and Bulgarian militias who died in the joint struggle against the Ottoman invaders. “Here on Shipka, rising in the heart of Stara Planina, in the heart of Bulgaria- said Todor Zhivkov, “Russian and Bulgarian blood mixed to weld forever, in spite of all the storms and elements of time, the Bulgarian-Russian friendship, the Bulgarian-Russian brotherhood.”

List of used literature:

1. Russian-Turkish War 1877-1878. Edited by I.I. Rostunova. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1977

2. Monuments of Soviet-Bulgarian friendship in Moldova. Chisinau, Timpul Publishing House, 1984.

4. Description of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. on the Balkan Peninsula.

5. Soviet-Bulgarian relations. 1948-1970. Documents and materials, M., 1974.

6. Great Soviet Encyclopedia. T.29, M., 1978.

Summary

On July 7 (19), 1877, Russian troops, after the battles of July 5-6 (17-18), occupied the Shipki Pass, which provided the shortest route to Istanbul. The Turkish command, having transferred the army of Suleiman Pasha from Montenegro to the Balkans, decided to carry out a counter-offensive in order to push the Russian troops beyond the Danube. The army of Suleiman Pasha (37.5 thousand people) was given the task of capturing Shipka, and then uniting with the main forces located in the area of ​​Rushchuk, Shumla, Silistria. Suleiman Pasha sent 27 thousand people with 48 guns to Shipka against the Russian-Bulgarian detachment of General N.G. Stoletov (4.8 thousand people, including 2 thousand Bulgarians, 27 guns), who occupied the pass. On August 9 (21), Turkish troops in the morning began persistent frontal attacks from the South and South-East on Mount St. Nicholas (in the southern part of the pass). The Russian-Bulgarian troops, strengthened on the day of August 9 (21) after the arrival of reserves to 7.5 thousand people with 28 guns, under the command of General V.F. Derozhinsky and N.G. Stoletova repelled multiple enemy attacks and inflicted heavy losses on him. On August 10 (22), the Turks regrouped and covered the pass in a semicircle from the West, South and East, and on August 11 (23) they began their assault from three directions. In exceptionally difficult conditions (great superiority of the enemy in forces: 25 thousand people, 34 guns against 7.2 thousand people and 28 guns, lack of ammunition, extreme heat and lack of water), the Russian-Bulgarian troops, heroically defending themselves, held their positions, despite significant losses (approximately 1,400 people). In the evening of August 11 (23) and the morning of August 12 (24), reinforcements arrived (up to 9 thousand people) led by General M.I. Dragomirov, who quickly counterattacked and drove back the enemy, who came close to the pass from the West and East. During stubborn battles that lasted until August 14 (26), Russian troops unsuccessfully tried to capture the heights west of the pass, after which they firmly entrenched themselves on Shipka. The losses of Russian troops amounted to about 4 thousand people (including over 500 Bulgarians), the Turks (according to clearly understated data) - over 6.6 thousand people.

The heroic defense of Shipka violated the plans of the Turkish command and prevented the loss of an important strategic line, which Russian troops held until going on the offensive in January 1878, repelling new Turkish attacks on September 5 (17) and withstanding the extremely difficult winter ‘Shipka sitting’.

The enemy contemptuously called the fortifications on Mount St. Nicholas a crow's nest. The Russian and Bulgarian soldiers who defended them proudly called them the Eagle's Nest.

Russian-Turkish wars of 1676-1918 - X. War of 1877-1878 Shirokorad Alexander Borisovich

Chapter 11 Defense of the Shipka Pass

Defense of Shipka Pass

At that time, the shortest road between the northern part of Bulgaria and Turkey went through the Shipka Pass. All other passes or passages in the Balkan Mountains are much less convenient for the passage of troops. The Turks understood the strategic importance of the pass, and entrusted the six thousand-strong detachment of Halyussi Pasha with nine guns to defend it.

To capture the pass, the Russian command formed two detachments - the Advanced detachment consisting of 10 battalions, 26 squadrons and hundreds with 14 mountain and 16 horse guns under the command of Lieutenant General Gurko, and the Gabrovsky detachment consisting of 3 battalions and 4 hundreds with 8 field and two horse guns under the command of Major General Derozhinsky.

Gurko led his detachment through the unguarded and difficult-to-pass Khainkoi Pass, which lies east of Shipka, and on the evening of July 5, 1877, came out from the south to the Shipka Pass. At dawn on July 6, the Advance Detachment attacked the Turks at the Shipka Pass from the rear, and the Gabrovsky Detachment began to advance from the front. The battle continued all day with varying success, and on the night of July 6-7, the Turks fled to the mountains. The Turks abandoned all their 9 cannons, of which two mountain guns were damaged, and six 8-cm Krupp cannons and one mountain gun were in full working order, and even with a large supply of ammunition.

The Turkish command decided to regain control of the Shipka Pass at any cost. The army of Suleiman Pasha moved there. It consisted of 48 infantry battalions, 5 cavalry squadrons, several thousand bashi-bazouks and 8 batteries, a total of 27 thousand people with 48 guns. On the night of August 8-9, the Turks approached the pass. By this time, the pass was defended by 6 thousand Russian soldiers and Bulgarian warriors with 27 guns (8 nine-pound and 8 four-pound field guns, 4 three-pound mountain guns, 6 Krupp 80-mm steel guns and one mountain gun. In Gabrovo there was a reserve of the Shipka detachment: the 35th infantry The Bryansk regiment of the 9th Infantry Division, two squads of the Bulgarian militia, one Cossack hundred and a platoon of the 10th Don Cossack battery, with a total number of about 3 thousand people with two horse guns.

80 mm Krupna gun manufactured in 1875, captured by the Russians at Shipka

The position on Shipka occupied by the Russians was an irregular quadrangle stretched along the Gabrovo road, the short sides of which ranged from 60 to 200 meters, and the long sides reached 2000 meters. The position included Mount St. Nicholas from the south, then Mount Volynskaya and Shipka with its southeastern and southwestern spurs. The last spur, due to its location and special significance in the defense system, received the name Central Mountain. The position had an almost circular front to the east, south and west. The slopes of the mountains forming it were steep, rocky, with sparse vegetation, which made the position very difficult for enemy attacks. Mount St. Nicholas dominated the surrounding area, except for Mount Maly Beredka and Bald Mountain, which exceeded it by 24 and 8 meters, respectively. This ensured, on the one hand, good review the entire surrounding area, and on the other hand, viewing the position itself from individual heights in the enemy’s location. The Russians and Bulgarians erected simple earthen fortifications at the top.

General course of military operations in the Balkans

On August 9, the Turks launched the first assault on Russian positions. Russian batteries literally bombarded the Turks with shrapnel and forced them to roll back, leaving many corpses on the slopes. Nevertheless, the Turks threw more and more forces into battle. On August 10-14, Turkish attacks alternated with Russian counterattacks. As a result, the Turks never managed to knock the Russians off the Shipka Pass, although the battle became extremely fierce. Suffice it to say that in 6 days of fighting, the Russians lost two generals, 108 officers, and 3,338 lower ranks on Shipka. Turkish losses were 2-4 times higher: according to Turkish data - 233 officers and 6527 lower ranks, according to Russian data - over 12 thousand people.

Further struggle for the pass came down to artillery exchanges, followed by attacks by Turkish infantry. Neither Russian nor Turkish guns could destroy the enemy's stone and earthen fortifications and suppress his artillery. The Russians successfully repelled Turkish attacks with shrapnel; in some cases, buckshot was used. It is curious that the greatest damage to the Russians was caused not by the latest Krupp artillery, but by a 14-gun mortar battery located 800 meters from the Russian positions. It was armed with smooth-bore copper 2- and 5-pound mortars - weapons from the “times of the Ochakovskys and the conquest of the Crimea”!

In early September, four 6-inch mortars of the 1867 model arrived at the Russians and opened fire on September 10. The shooting was carried out from closed positions and was quite effective. So, on October 8, two 6-inch mortars opened fire on the “nine-eyed” Turkish battery and hit the enemy gun with the third shot.

The Shipka “sitting” lasted more than five months, from July 7 to December 18, 1877. With some stretch, we can say that Shipka became for the Turks something like Plevna.

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On February 24, 1878, exhausted by the winter campaign, but inspired by victories, Russian troops occupied San Stefano and approached the suburbs of Istanbul - that is, the very walls of Constantinople. The Russian army took a direct road to the Turkish capital. There was no one to defend Istanbul - the best Turkish armies capitulated, one was blocked in the Danube region, and the army of Suleiman Pasha was recently defeated south of the Balkan Mountains. Skobelev was appointed commander of the 4th Army Corps, stationed in the vicinity of Adrianople. The army had a dream of capturing Constantinople, of returning the Byzantine capital to the fold of the Orthodox Church. This dream did not come true. But in that war, the Russian soldier won freedom for Orthodox Bulgaria, and also contributed to the independence of the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Romanians. We celebrate the victorious end of the war, as a result of which the Orthodox peoples received a chance for free development.

Nikolai Dmitrievich Dmitriev-Orenburgsky. General M.D. Skobelev on horseback. 1883

The years 1877-1878 remained in people's memory as one of the most glorious pages of battle and political history. The feat of the heroes of Plevna and Shipka, the liberators of Sofia, is honored both in Russia and in Bulgaria. It was an impeccable war of liberation - and the Balkans had been waiting for it for a long time, they hoped for Russia, they understood that help could only come from St. Petersburg and Moscow.

The Balkans remember heroes. One of the main churches of Sofia is the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral, a symbol of liberation from the Ottoman yoke. It was erected in memory of Russian soldiers who died in the battles for the liberation of Bulgaria. From 1878 to this day in Bulgaria, during the liturgy in Orthodox churches, during the great entrance of the liturgy of the faithful, Alexander II and all Russian soldiers who died in the war of liberation are remembered. Bulgaria has not forgotten those battles!

Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Sofia

Nowadays, the friendship between Russians and Bulgarians is being dangerously tested. There are many false and therefore disappointed expectations in this story. Alas, our peoples suffer from an “inferiority complex,” and patriots have become painfully vulnerable - and therefore always choose the path to disengagement, to grievances and conflicts. Therefore, false legends are used - for example, that during the Great Patriotic War the Bulgarians fought against the Red Army. But the authorities of the then Bulgaria, being allies of Hitler, flatly refused to participate in hostilities against Russia. They understood that the Bulgarians would not shoot at the Russians...

Bulgaria is the only country among the Reich's allies that did not fight with the USSR, despite the hysterical pressure of Hitler's diplomacy.

The anti-fascist underground in Bulgaria arose as soon as Germany attacked the USSR. And since 1944, the First Bulgarian Army fought the Nazis as part of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

Today there are many professional truth-tellers and provocateurs, and they like to talk about the “ungratefulness” of the Slavic peoples, who often fought against Russia. They say, we don’t need such little brothers... Instead of quarreling nations by looking for the slightest reason, it would be better to remember General Stoychev more often - the only foreign commander who participated in the Victory Parade in Moscow on June 24, 1945! Such an honor was not given for beautiful eyes. Popular wisdom is not wrong: “They carry water for the offended.” Collecting grievances is the lot of the weak.

Bulgaria is not a vassal of Russia, it did not swear allegiance to Russia. But it is difficult to find in Europe a people closer to Russian in culture.

Bulgarians know and respect Russia. It is always easy for us to find a common language. Just don’t put your hopes on big politics, just as you shouldn’t believe in its propaganda support...

But let's talk about the factors of the 1878 victory. And oh controversial issues in the interpretation of that war.

Crossing of the Russian army across the Danube at Zimnitsa on June 15, 1877, Nikolai Dmitriev-Orenburgsky (1883)

1. Did Russia really selflessly fight for the freedom of fraternal peoples?

This was, as we know, not the first Russian-Turkish war. Russia inflicted several attacks on the Ottoman Empire powerful blows. Established a foothold on the Black Sea. In Crimea, in the Caucasus.

But the officers dreamed of a liberation campaign in the Balkans, and the leaders of thought - priests, writers - called for help for the Orthodox peoples. This was the main thing.

Of course, we were also talking about the state prestige of Russia, which had to be restored after the unsuccessful Crimean War. Strategists and dreamers thought about the liberation of Constantinople and control over the straits. But, as is known, Russia refrained from such radical actions. London, Paris, Berlin would not allow the Ottoman Empire to be completely destroyed, and St. Petersburg understood this.

2. What was the reason for the war? Why did it start in 1877?

In 1876, the Turks brutally suppressed the April Uprising in Bulgaria. The troops of the Bulgarian rebels were defeated, even the elderly and children were subjected to repression... Russian diplomacy was unable to obtain concessions from Istanbul, and in April 1877, without enlisting the support of any significant allies except Austria-Hungary, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Fighting began in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

3. What does the expression “Everything is calm on Shipka” mean?

“Everything is Calm on Shipka” is one of the most truthful pictures about the war, the creation of Vasily Vereshchagin. And at the same time, these are the famous words of General Fyodor Radetsky addressed to the commander-in-chief. He constantly repeated this report, no matter how difficult it was. It turned out that the death of soldiers was something that was taken for granted and not worth reporting.

The artist was hostile to Radetsky. Vereshchagin visited the Shipka Pass, painted soldiers from life, painted snow trenches. It was then that the idea of ​​a triptych was born - a requiem for a common soldier.

The first picture depicts a sentry, knee-deep in a blizzard, apparently forgotten and lonely by everyone. On the second - he is still standing, although he is covered with snow up to his chest. The soldier did not flinch! The sentry was not changed. The cold and blizzard turned out to be stronger than him, and in the third picture we see only a huge snowdrift in the place of the sentry, the only reminder of which is the corner of his greatcoat, not yet covered with snow.

The simple plot makes a strong impression and makes you think about the ugly side of the war. In the snows of Shipka there remains the grave of an unknown soldier, a Russian sentry. There is both bitter satire and a monument to the courage of the Russian soldier, faithful to his duty, capable of miracles of fortitude.

This picture is well known in both Russia and Bulgaria. The memory of the famous and unknown heroes who fought in 1878 for the freedom of Bulgaria will not die. “Everything is calm on Shipka” - these words for us are both the definition of bragging and a symbol of reliability. From which side should you look? And heroes remain heroes.

Vasily Vereshchagin. Everything is calm on Shipka. 1878, 1879

4. How did you manage to liberate the Bulgarian capital - Sofia?

The Bulgarian city was the main supply base for the Turkish army. And the Turks defended Sofia with fury. The battles for the city began on December 31, 1877 near the village of Gorni-Bogrov. Bulgarian volunteers fought alongside the Russians. Gurko's troops cut off the enemy's path to retreat to Plovdiv. The Turkish commander Nuri Pasha was terrified of being surrounded and hastily retreated to the west, leaving 6 thousand wounded in the city... He gave the order to burn the city. The intervention of Italian diplomats saved the city from destruction.

On January 4, the Russian army entered Sofia. The centuries-old Turkish yoke was put to an end. On this winter day, Sofia blossomed. The Bulgarians enthusiastically greeted the Russians, and General Gurko was crowned with triumphant laurels.

The classic of Bulgarian literature Ivan Vazov wrote:

“Mom, mom! Look, look..."
"What's there?" - “Guns, sabers I see...”
“Russians!..” - “Yes, then they are,
Let's go meet them closer.
It was God himself who sent them,
To help us, son."
The boy, having forgotten his toys,
He ran to meet the soldiers.
Like the sun I'm glad:
“Hello, brothers!”

5. How was the Russian army treated in Bulgaria?

The soldiers were greeted hospitably, as liberators, as brothers. The generals were treated like kings. Moreover, the Bulgarians fought shoulder to shoulder with the Russians; it was a true military brotherhood.

Before the start of the war, the Bulgarian militia was quickly formed from among refugees and residents of Bessarabia. The militia was commanded by General N.G. Stoletov. By the beginning of hostilities, he had 5 thousand Bulgarians at his disposal. During the war, more and more patriots joined them. Flying partisan detachments operated behind enemy lines. The Bulgarians provided the Russian army with food and intelligence. The inscriptions on the monuments to Russian soldiers, of which there are hundreds in modern Bulgaria, also testify to the military brotherhood:

Bow to you, Russian army, which delivered us from Turkish slavery.
Bow down, Bulgaria, to the graves with which you are strewn.
Eternal glory to the Russian soldiers who fell for the liberation of Bulgaria.

Russia does not border with Bulgaria. But never has one people come to the rescue of another with such courage. And never before has any people kept gratitude to another people for so many years - like a shrine.

Nizhny Novgorod dragoons pursuing the Turks on the road to Kars

6. At what cost was it possible to break the resistance of the Ottomans in that war?

The war was fierce. More than 300,000 Russian soldiers took part in the fighting in the Balkans and the Caucasus. The textbook data on losses are as follows: 15,567 killed, 56,652 wounded, 6,824 died from wounds. There are also data that are twice as high as our losses... The Turks lost 30 thousand killed, another 90 thousand died from wounds and illnesses.

The Russian army was not superior to the Turks in weapons or equipment. But the superiority was great in the combat training of the soldiers and in the level of military art of the generals.

Another factor in the victory was the military reform developed by D.A. Milyutin. The Minister of War managed to rationalize the management of the army. And the army was grateful to him for the 1870 model Berdanka (Berdan rifle). The shortcomings of the reform had to be corrected during the campaign: for example, Skobelev decided to replace the inconvenient soldiers’ backpacks with canvas bags, which made life easier for the army.

The Russian soldier had to fight an unusual mountain war. They fought in the most difficult conditions. If it were not for the iron character of our soldiers, they would not have survived either Shipka or Plevna.

Monument to Freedom at Shipka Pass

7. Why did the Bulgarians find themselves in the camp of Russia’s opponents in the First World War?

What is this - deceit, treachery? Rather, it is a path of mutual mistakes. Relations between the two Orthodox kingdoms became strained during the Balkan Wars, in which Bulgaria competed for the laurels of the leading power in the region. Russia made attempts to restore influence in the Balkans, our diplomats invented various combinations. But - to no avail. Eventually, Prime Minister Radoslavov began to be depicted in angry caricatures in Russia.

The Balkans in those years turned into a tangle of contradictions, the main one of which was enmity between two Orthodox peoples - Bulgarian and Serbian.

Studying the history of mutual and cross territorial claims of neighboring peoples is instructive. So Bulgaria entered the First World War, declaring war on Serbia. That is, on the side of the “Central Powers” ​​and against the Entente. This was a great success for German diplomacy, supported by loans that Berlin provided to Bulgaria.

The Bulgarians fought against the Serbs and Romanians, and at first they fought very successfully. As a result, we ended up as losers.

Shipka in Bulgaria is a peak with a height of 1523m. in the Balkan Mountains, also this small town and the famous Shipka Pass through the Balkans.

Shipka - mountain

The original name of the peak was Sveti Nikolai. In 1954, by decision of the Bulgarian Communist Party, it was renamed Stoletov, in honor of General Stoletov, the head of the defense of Shipka. But the general’s first name was also Nikolai and the people continued to call the peak in the old way. In 1977, the name was changed again, this time to Shipka, despite the fact that there was already an elevation with that name. Nowadays the peak and its surroundings are a national park-museum. At the very top stands the Freedom Monument. Erected in 1934 with voluntary donations from the Bulgarian people.

Shipka - city

The city of Shipka is located at the southern foot of the Balkan Mountains, just before the entrance to the Shipka Pass, 12 km from the city of Kazanlak. Near the town of Shipka there is one of the holiest monuments of Bulgarian-Russian friendship - the Church-Monument of the Nativity of Christ.

Shipka Pass

Shipka Pass, (Bulgarian: Shipchensky Pass) is a mountain pass through the Balkans. Height - 1185 m. The highway between the cities of Kazanlak passes through the pass and Gabrovo, Veliko Tarnovo. The Shipka Pass goes along a narrow spur of the main Balkan ridge, gradually rising to Mount St. Nicholas, from where the road descends steeply into the Tundzhi valley.
Currently, the Shipka Tunnel project exists but has not been implemented.

History of Shipka

The Thracians inhabited this place in ancient times. Many archaeological remains (tombs, weapons, armor, coins) of that period were found in the vicinity of the towns of Shipka and Kazanlak. In the 1st century BC e. the city was conquered by the Romans. When the Turks captured Bulgaria in 1396, they created a garrison in the city of Shipka to guard and control the Shipka Pass. In the vicinity of Shipka and Sheinovo, some of the bloodiest battles were fought in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 (Defense of Shipka in the war for the liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman yoke). The Freedom Monument on Mount Shipka (Stoletov Peak) is dedicated to the memory of the fallen. In 1954, the feature film Heroes of Shipka was shot at Lenfilm.

Defense of Shipka

The defense of Shipka is one of the key and most famous episodes in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78. After the Russian army crossed the Danube, the commander-in-chief decided to immediately seize the passes through the Balkan ridge for further movement into Turkey. The advance detachment of General Gurko, having crossed the Halinoi Pass and defeated the Turks near the village of Uflany and the city of Kazanlak, on July 5 approached the Shipka Pass from the south, occupied by a Turkish detachment (about 5 thousand people) under the command of Hulyussi Pasha. On the same day, a detachment of General Svyatopolk-Mirsky attacked Shipka from the northern side, but the attack was repulsed. On July 6, General Gurko launched an attack on the pass from the south and also failed. Nevertheless, Hulyussi Pasha, considering his position dangerous, on the night of the 6th to the 7th, took side roads to the city of Kalofer, abandoning artillery at his positions. Then Shipka was immediately occupied by the troops of Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky. After the retreat of the advance detachment of General Gurko from Transbalkania, Shipka entered the area of ​​the southern front of the Russian army, entrusted with the protection of the troops of General Radetzky, which had to be stretched over more than 100 miles; the general reserve was located near Tyrnov. The position occupied by Russian troops on Shipka did not at all meet the tactical requirements: its only advantage was its inaccessibility. Stretching several miles deep along an extremely narrow (25-30 fathoms) ridge, it was subjected along its entire length to crossfire from neighboring dominant heights, providing neither natural cover nor convenience for going on the offensive. Despite all this, due to strategic requirements, it was necessary to keep this passage in our hands at all costs. At the beginning of August 1877, Radetzky had good reason to fear that Suleiman Pasha’s army would cross into northern Bulgaria, along one of the eastern passes, and advance towards Tarnovo. Therefore, when alarming news was received (which later turned out to be an exaggeration) about the strengthening of enemy troops against our detachments near the cities of Elena and Zlataritsa, the general reserve was sent (August 8) to these points and thus moved away from Shipka to a distance of 3-4 large marches. Meanwhile, Suleiman, after the retreat of General Gurko, set out to capture Shipka and by August 8 concentrated about 28 thousand against it, with 36 guns. At that time, we had only the Oryol infantry regiment and 5 Bulgarian squads (up to 4 thousand people in total), with 27 guns, to which, already during the battle, next day, the Bryansk regiment arrived from the city of Selvi, increasing the number of Shipka defenders to 6 thousand. On the morning of August 9, enemy artillery, having occupied Mount Maly Bedek, east of Shipka, opened fire. The subsequent attacks of the Turkish infantry, first from the south, then from the east, were all repelled by our fire. The battle lasted all day; At night, Russian troops, expecting a repeat attack, had to strengthen their positions. On August 10, the Turks did not resume attacks, and the matter was limited to artillery and rifle fire. Meanwhile, Radetzky, having received news of the danger threatening Shipka, moved a general reserve there; but he could arrive, and then with intensive transitions, only on the 11th; in addition, another infantry unit was ordered to go to Shipka to the brigade with the battery stationed at Selvi, which could only arrive in time on the 12th. August 11th was the most critical day for the defenders of the pass. The battle began at dawn; by 10 o'clock in the morning our position was covered by the enemy from three sides. The Turkish attacks, repulsed by our fire, were renewed with fierce persistence. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon the Turks even came to the rear of our position, but were driven back. At 5 o'clock, Turkish troops advancing from the western side captured the so-called Side Hill and threatened to break through the central part of the position. The position of the Shipka defenders was already almost hopeless when finally, at 7 o’clock in the evening, part of the reserve arrived at the position - the 16th Infantry Battalion, raised to the pass on Cossack horses. He was immediately moved to the Side Hill and, with the assistance of other units that went on the offensive, recaptured it from the enemy. The remaining battalions of the 4th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Major General Tsvetsinsky, then arrived in time and made it possible to stop the Turkish pressure on other parts of the position. The battle ended at dusk. Our troops held out on Shipka, however, the Turks also managed to maintain their disposition that surrounded us; their battle lines were only a few hundred paces from ours. On the night of the 12th, the 2nd brigade of the 14th Infantry Division ascended to Shipka, with the arrival of which Radetzky had 20.5 battalions, with 38 guns, and therefore decided the next day to go on the offensive to knock down the Turks from two heights the western ridge - the so-called Forest Mound and Bald Mountain, from where they had the most convenient approaches to our position and even threatened its rear. The Turks warned us and at dawn on August 12 they attacked the central sections of our position, and at 2 o’clock in the afternoon they attacked Mount St. Nicholas. They were repulsed at all points, but the attack we launched on the Forest Mound was also unsuccessful. On August 13, Radetzky decided to resume the attack on Lesnoy Kurgan and Lesnaya Gora, having the opportunity to bring more troops into action due to the arrival of another Volyn regiment with a battery on Shipka. At the same time, Suleiman significantly strengthened his left flank. Throughout the day (August 13), there was a battle for possession of the mentioned heights; The Turks were driven off the Forest Mound, but their fortifications on Bald Mountain could not be captured. The attacking troops retreated to the Forest Mound and here, during the evening, night, and at dawn on the 14th, they were repeatedly attacked by the enemy. All attacks were repulsed, but our troops suffered such heavy losses that Radetzky, lacking fresh reinforcements, ordered them to retreat to Side Hill. The forest mound was again occupied by the Turks. In the 6-day battle on Shipka, up to 3,350 people were out of action, including 2 generals (Dragomirov was wounded, Derozhinsky was killed) and 108 officers; the Turks lost more than twice as much. This battle did not have any significant results; both sides remained in their positions, but our troops, surrounded by the enemy on three sides, were still in a very difficult situation, which soon worsened significantly with the onset of autumn bad weather, and then winter cold and blizzards. From August 15, Shipka was occupied by the 14th Infantry Division and the 4th Infantry Brigade, under the command of General Petrushevsky, The Oryol and Bryansk regiments, as the most affected, were put into reserve, and the Bulgarian squads were transferred to the village of Zeleno Drevo to occupy the path through the Imitli Pass, which bypasses Shipka from the west. From this time on, the “Shipka seat” begins - one of the most difficult episodes of the war. The defenders of Shipka, doomed to passive defense, were concerned mainly with strengthening their positions and creating, if possible, closed passages of communication with the rear. The Turks also strengthened and expanded their fortification work and continuously showered the Russian position with bullets and artillery shells. On September 5, at 3 a.m., they again launched an attack from the south and west. They managed to take possession of the so-called Eagle's Nest - a rocky and steep cape protruding in front of Mount St. Nicholas, from where they were driven out only after a desperate hand-to-hand fight. The column advancing from the west (from the Forest Mound) was repelled by fire. After this, the Turks no longer launched serious attacks, but limited themselves to shelling the position. With the onset of winter, the position of the troops on Shipka became extremely difficult; frosts and snowstorms on the mountain tops were especially sensitive; the dugouts built by the soldiers provided poor protection from cold and dampness; V warm clothes there was a great shortage, and there were frequent cases of sentries freezing at their posts. These hardships were especially noticeable for the troops that had not yet suffered: three regiments of the 24th division, which had recently arrived from Russia and were sent to replace the units occupying Shipka, literally melted away from disease in a short time. In general, during the period from September 5 to December 24, only about 700 people were killed and wounded in the Shipka detachment, and up to 9.5 thousand were sick. The end of 1877 was also marked by the end of the “Shipka seat”, the last act of which was the attack on Turkish positions on the road from Mount St. Nicholas to the village of Shipka.

Transport

You can get to the top of the mountain and the museum either by car or by excursion bus. There is a parking lot in front of the peak, but you can also climb to the peak itself by car, although the road is very steep.

Attractions:

Church-monument of the Nativity of Christ (Bulgarian: Temple-monument of the Nativity of Christ)

The temple, also called the Shipka Monastery, is the first monument to Bulgarian-Russian friendship on the territory of Bulgaria. It is located on the southern side of the Shipka Pass, in the vicinity of the town of Shipka. Inside the temple and on the walls of the open galleries there are 34 marble slabs with the names of military units that participated in the battles for Shipka, as well as the names of Russian soldiers and officers, and Bulgarian militias who fell during the defense of Shipka and in the battles near the cities of Kazanlak and Stara Zagora. The remains of heroes rest in sarcophagi in the crypt of the temple. The bells were cast in Russia - the Russian military department allocated about 30 tons of spent cartridges for their production. There are a total of 17 bells in the temple, the largest bell weighs 11,643 kg and is a personal gift from Emperor Nicholas II. The idea of ​​the temple, its design belongs to Olga Nikolaevna Skobeleva, the mother of the famous General Skobelev. The idea became a national cause, funds for its implementation flowed in from civil and military organizations, numerous donors, and ordinary citizens of Russia and Bulgaria. The construction committee was headed by Count Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev. The will of the donors - the temple was created for the prayerful commemoration of the liberating soldiers, therefore, like the cathedral of Prince. Alexander Nevsky in Sofia, it received the name “monument temple”. Construction began in 1885 and ended in 1902. The monument-temple consists of a church, a monastery building, a hotel for pilgrims, an orphanage and a theological seminary. The temple is cross-domed, with a square naos and three apses, the height of the bell tower is 53.4 meters. Architect A. Tomishko used motifs from the Yaroslavl school of church architecture of the 17th century. The official opening ceremony took place on September 27, 1902, Count Ignatiev made a solemn speech on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Shipka epic. Especially for this occasion, an imperial delegation arrived from Russia, which included Mikhail Ivanovich Dragomirov, Nikolai Grigorievich Stoletov, Konstantin Chilyaev, Count Mikhail Pavlovich Tolstoy and others. On the territory of Bulgaria there are over 450 monuments that are dedicated to the Russian liberators (as the Bulgarians call all participants in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878), but this one is considered the most beautiful and impressive. On February 9, 2005, the Church-Monument of the Nativity of Christ on Shipka was transferred to the ownership of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited it along with Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov on March 3, 2003 (March 3 is the day the Treaty of San Stefano was signed, which brought freedom to Bulgaria after five centuries of Ottoman rule.)

Monument to Freedom on the Shipka Pass (Bulgarian: Monument to Freedom "Shipka")

The monument is a memorial in memory of those who fell for the liberation of Bulgaria during the defense of the Shipka Pass in the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78. The monument is located on Stoletov Peak, rising above the pass. There are 890 steps leading from the parking lot at the pass to the monument. The monument was opened in 1934. Built according to the design of architect Atanas Donkov and sculptor Alexander Andreev with donations from the Bulgarian people. The memorial is a stone tower in the form of a truncated pyramid 31.5 m high. A giant bronze lion, 8 m long and 4 m high, is located above the entrance to the tower, and the figure of a woman symbolizes the victory over the Ottoman troops. On the ground floor there is a marble sarcophagus with the remains of several who died during the defense. There are four more floors where there is an exhibition of Bulgarian military flags and other relics. From the top of the tower there is a breathtaking view of the Shipka Pass and the surrounding area. Every August, a historical reconstruction events of 1877. An important part of the event is a memorial service for the Russian, Belarusian, Ukrainian, Romanian and Finnish soldiers who died here, as well as the Bulgarian militia. They are given military honors, government leaders and people of Bulgaria lay wreaths of fresh flowers at the monument on the top of the hill as a sign of their gratitude.